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Propositions 
  1. Corruption is the absence of collective identity. (this thesis) 
 2. The only way to understand collective organizing processes is to become part of them.   (this thesis) 
 3. ‘Development’ and ‘money’ are concepts associated to very specific ways of thinking.         4. There are as many types of intervention as there are realities. 
 5. Whoever is free of intervention, let him be the first to accuse his neighbour of being an intervenor. 
 6. A PhD thesis should be written in the candidate’s native language and then translated.   
 7. Money is a means to weaken the spirit. 
 8. Collective action is a need.       Propositions belonging to the thesis entitled   “Going for the dough: Negotiated interventions in the Ciénega de Zacapu, Mexico”  Fidencio Servín Juárez  Wageningen, 6 February 2018. 
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level	 of	 investment.	 The	 greenhouses,	 for	 example,	 were	 projected	 to	 cost	 close	 to	 USD	
200,000	each.	In	order	to	finance	the	program,	the	policy	stated	that	investment	would	be	
obtained	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 public	 and	 private	 funding.	 In	 this	 setup,	 the	 State	 of	
Michoacán	would	provide	30%	of	program	costs,	beneficiaries	would	participate	by	financing	
10%	 in	 kind,	 while	 the	 remaining	 60%	 would	 be	 provided	 by	 private	 credit	 sources.	
Greenhouse	 tomatoes	would	 be	 grown	 through	 hydroponic	methods	 –	 implying	 technical	
skills	and	experience	that	were	non-existent	in	the	region	at	the	time.	In	addition,	the	program	






to	 fulfil	 other	 institutional	 requirements	 to	 be	 able	 to	 have	 access	 to	 the	 30%	 of	 the	
government’s	fund,	and	also	to	secure	a	mechanism	for	tomato	merchandising.	
In	order	to	be	eligible	for	program	resources,	the	SPRs	needed	to	create	a	second-level	
organization,	 an	 Unión	 de	 Sociedades	 de	 Producción	 Rural	 (USPR)5.	 Since	 some	 of	 the	
beneficiaries	had	previous	experience	in	organizing	and	participating	in	programs	similar	to	
the	one	promoted	by	SUPLADER,	they	could	count	on	an	extensive	network	of	relationships	















In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 USPR,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 State’s	 regulatory	 framework	 and	
private	 interests	sharply	contrasted	with	 the	means	of	 the	beneficiaries,	who	nevertheless	
managed	to	reinterpret	the	regulations	and	interests	of	such	‘external’	actors	to	their	own	
convenience.	This	situation	very	much	resembles	Long	and	Long’s	(1992;	2007)	argument	that,	






thus	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	multiplicity	 of	 discourses	 justifying	 or	 denouncing	 particular	 forms	 of	





subjects	 who	 had	 previously	 been	 invisible	 to	 the	 State	 –	 thus	 modifying	 top-down	
intervention	strategies	from	within	(Escobar,	2011).	Yet,	the	inclusion	of	these	members	of	
civil	 society	 into	 the	 SUPLADER	 program	 brought	 to	 light	 the	 contradictions	 between	 the	
conditions	set	by	the	State	to	carry	out	the	program,	and	the	actors’	practices.	Indeed,	and	as	
I	will	show	throughout	this	thesis,	the	image	of	orderly	and	vertical	State	planning	contrasted	





the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	 implied	a	series	of	structural	changes	that	reflect	 the	way	 in	which	




relationships	 that	 were	 subject	 to	 political	 expediency	 and	 couched	 in	 terms	 that	 were	
suitable	 for	 institutional	 agents	 and	 alien	 to,	 especially,	 organized	 farmers’	 groups.	 In	
particular,	 these	 power	 relations	 were	 strongly	 linked	 to	 corporatism,	 a	 form	 of	 sectoral	
organization	introduced	during	the	Lázaro	Cárdenas	del	Río	Administration	between	1934	and	
1940	(Benítez,	1984).	Corporatism	required	community	strengthening	and,	in	some	cases,	the	
expropriation	 of	 the	means	 of	 production	 and	 its	 transfer	 to	 social	 groups	 (e.g.	 the	 ejido	
system)	 backing	 the	 State.	 In	 this	way,	 strong	 political	 alliances	were	 forged	 between	 the	
Institutional	Revolutionary	Party	(PRI)	and	its	clients.	Corporatism	implied	strong,	vertical	links	
between	 local	 trade	 unions	 and	 virtually	 all	 types	 of	 local	 associations	 with	 national	
institutions	such	as	Workers’	Union	(CTM),	the	National	Peasant	Confederation	(CNC),	and	the	
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Railroad	 Workers’	 Union	 (STFRM).	 This	 clientelist	 mode	 of	 organization	 was	 the	 pillar	 of	





public	policies	were	still	based	on	participatory	approaches	 that	carried	 their	 social	 justice	
message	to	development	programs.			
	 Neoliberalism	proposed	abandoning	the	economic	model	of	the	State	intervention	and	
the	welfare	State	on	grounds	of	 its	 inefficiency,	corruption,	 ‘obesity’,	and	corporatism.	The	
new,	neoliberal	policies	proposed	to	reduce	the	presence	of	the	government	in	the	daily	life	
of	its	subjects,	promising	to	restore	the	allocative	power	of	the	market	to	distribute	resources	





undermined	 social	 and	 economic	 institutions,	 and	 three	 successive	 administrations	 have	












The	 use	 of	 a	 participatory	 approach	 in	 planned	 development	 intervention	 is	 increasingly	
common	in	rural	areas	in	Mexico	(Mora,	1985;	Bernkopfová,	2011;	Barton	&	Merino-Pérez,	
2004;	Beaucage,	2007;	Zazueta,	1995).	The	approach	enrols	actors	in	intervention	processes	






participatory	approaches	 themselves.	 Long	&	Long	 (1992)	and	Zazueta	 (1995)	address	 this	
concern	 through	 an	 actor-oriented	 perspective,	 re-conceptualizing	 the	 implementation	 of	
	4	
programs	 and	 projects	 by	 describing	 how	 actors	 use	 their	 repertoires,	 focusing	 on	 the	
changes,	 continuities,	 discontinuities,	 and	 conflicts	 that	 occur	 at	 the	 interface	 between	
beneficiaries	and	intervening	parties	(Long,	2001).	
I	 agree	with	 statements	 (e.g.	Diego	1997)	which	propose	 that	 certain	elements	are	
central	 to	 the	 trajectories	 of	 projects,	 such	 as	 beneficiaries’	 organizing	 capacity	 and	







Often,	 actors	 had	 previous	 experience	 with	 similar	 participatory	 projects,	 which	
strengthened	the	repertoires	they	used	to	manage	and	resignify	new	projects,	like	in	the	case	
of	the	greenhouses.	In	this	thesis,	I	use	key	concepts	like	agency,	knowledge	and	interface,	
associations,	 and	 organizing	 processes	 taken	 from	development	 theories	 such	 as	 those	 of	
Escobar,	 Long’s	 actor-oriented	 approach	 and	 Latour’s	 actor-network	 theory	 to	 analyze	





of	 those	 involved	 (Escobar,	 1997).	 This	 discussion	 remains	 relevant,	 especially	 under	 the	
prevailing	neoliberal	model	 in	which	planned	 intervention	 is	 still	 on	 the	map.	 I	 agree	with	
Escobar	when	he	states	that:	






	 	 	 	 	




of	 the	 government	 of	Michoacán	 in	which	 planners	 proposed	 an	 intervention	 based	 on	 a	
model	 in	which	 individuals	were	expected	 to	be	 interested	 in	productive	projects	 through	
collective	forms	of	organization	(SPRs	and	USPRs).	However,	the	planners	did	not	take	into	
account	 interactions	between	stakeholders,	or	 the	way	 in	which	they	would	mobilize	 their	
skills,	 agency,	 experience	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 collective	 projects,	 and	 how	 this	 would	
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actors	who,	 in	their	 interactions,	appealed	to	their	 lifeworlds	and	 livelihoods,	as	well	as	 to	
their	cultural	repertoires	and	experiences	(Long,	2001).	
The	socio-technical	trajectories	of	the	greenhouse	project	were	captured	with	the	aid	
of	 actor-network	 theory	 (Latour,	 1999)	 because	 of	 the	 importance	 it	 places	 on	 flows	 of	
resources	and	the	strengthening	of	networks	and	groups.	Actor-network	theory	allows	me	to	
look	into	the	way	actors	put	together	their	projects	through	heterogeneous	means.	In	other	
words,	 how	 they	 put	 forward	 their	 strategies	 to	 strengthen	 the	 networks	 linked	 to	 their	










As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 this	 study,	 actors	 assembled	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 had	
different	 motivations	 for	 becoming	 enrolled	 in	 'development'.	 “Going	 for	 the	 dough”	 or	
pursuing	the	cash	flows	involved	in	the	organizing	processes,	tries	to	analyze	how	these	are	
deployed	 to	 access	 governmental	 resources	 for	 greenhouse	 production	 of	 vegetables.	 To	
achieve	their	mission,	actors	had	to	engage,	collaborate,	enrol	and	fight	other	actors	seeking	
the	same	objective.	In	other	words,	actors	did	not	play	the	roles	attributed	to	them	by	the	




ejidatarios	 established	 relations	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 ejido.	 I	 thus	 understand	

















































and	 following	 Zazueta	 (1995),	 I	 needed	 to	 be	 closely	 involved	with	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	
greenhouse	projects,	in	order	to	unravel	such	interaction	processes.	I	wanted	to	bring	to	light	
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the	 ‘hidden’	 intervention	 practices	 that	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 development	 intervention,	
revealing	the	actors’	room	for	manoeuvre	and	clever	use	of	resources.	I	became	interested	in	
the	dynamics	of	the	organizing	processes	that	arose	from	the	planned	intervention	project	for	
regional	 development	 that	 involved	 the	 establishment	 of	 28	 greenhouses	 due	 to	 the	
challenges	involved.	The	project	was	basically	financed	by	governmental	resources	allocated	





to	 be	 associated	with	 the	 consolidated	 collectives	 that	were	 formally	 recognized	 and	 had	
organizational	 experience.	 After	 reflecting	 upon	 the	 SUPLADER	 proposal,	 I	 realized	 that	




The	 original	 intention	was	 to	 study	 the	 organizing	 and	 political	 processes	 in	 Coeneo	 (see	


















to	his	networks	of	 family,	 friends,	 and	 relatives,	 and	he	bonded	me	with	other	actors	and	 resources	 in	his	
network.	In	this	way,	I	met	El	Campeón,	and	other	actors	who	shared	capacities	and	resources,	to	carry	out	






so	 in	 a	 sense,	 data	 are	 public.	 But	 I	 acknowledge	 the	 potential	 ethical	 dilemma,	 where	
sensitivities	may	arise	in	my	description	of	their	actions	and	interaction	processes.	I	therefore	
decided	to	change	the	real	names	of	the	actors	involved	so	as	to	guarantee	their	anonymity.	
The	 greenhouse	 project	 gave	 me	 the	 opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 process	 of	
project	development	by	way	of	an	action-research	(Reason	&	Bradbury,	2008;	Brydon-Miller,	







my	 quest	 to	 follow	 the	 actors,	 this	 brought	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 describing	 the	 partial	
realities	during	my	fieldwork,	and	discover	how	these	began	to	cohere.		Apart	from	the	huge	






(Blanco	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Chang,	 2008).	 This	 research	method	 autoethnography	 allowed	me	 to	
include	personal	experiences	and	autobiographical	reflections.	It	was	necessary	to	enhance	
my	 experiences	 as	 a	 researcher,	while	 giving	 priority	 to	 practice.	 These	 experiences	were	
collected	by	me	as	an	ethnographer	and	a	researcher,	in	a	specific	social	and	cultural	context.	






and	 significance	 at	 a	 local	 level	 (Hammersley	&	Atkinson,	 2007;	 Barley,	 2004).	 In	 order	 to	
describe	the	interactions	in	more	depth,	the	case	study	method	(Mitchell,	1983)	was	used	to	
bring	 together	 interfaces	 reflected	 through	narratives	 (Grillo,	 1997)	deployed	 in	meetings,	
interviews	 and	 informal	 gatherings,	 in	order	 to	 identify	 the	 configuration	 and	 scale	of	 the	
formal	organizing	processes	recognized	by	the	State,	such	as	statutes	and	standards	used	in	
the	SPRs	and	USPR.	
The	 actor-network	 approach	 was	 used	 to	 understand	 the	 actors’	 participation	 in	
collective	decision-making,	 their	organizing	processes,	 and	 the	 link	between	networks	and	
meanings	in	producer	associations,	government	agencies,	and	companies	in	the	technology	























collective	processes	provided	with	emergent	organizing	 forms,	 identified	with	a	model	 for	
regional	development.	This	view	allows	me	to	expand	the	scenario	and	include	the	State,	its	




are	displayed.	En	pos	de	 la	 lana	 (“in	pursuit	of	 the	dough”)	 reflects	how	actors	 strategize,	
organize,	perceive,	reinterpret,	and	enrol	in	development	from	their	different	perspectives,	











Zacapu.	 The	 actors	 and	 their	 networks	 are	 immersed	 in	 this	 historicity,	 which	 allows	 to	
























of	 Indigenous	people).	With	corn	as	the	staple	crop,	 traditional	 forms	of	production	 in	the	
Ciénega	continued	until	the	middle	of	the	1980's	when	mechanization	was	introduced	into	
the	 region.	After	much	political	 strife	 in	 the	early	20th	 century,	 the	Federal	Planning	 Law,	
which	 sought	 to	 incorporate	 democratic	 elements	 in	 the	 public	 administration,	 was	
established	in	1983.	
By	the	1980s,	planning	in	Michoacán	was	in	charge	of	the	State	and	represented	by	the	
Secretariat	 of	 Planning	 and	 Development	 (SEPLADE).	 Supervised	 by	 SEPLADE,	 in	 Zacapu	
















intervention	of	 the	 State	 the	Ciénega	was	 chosen	 to	 become	 the	 site	 of	 capitalist	 domes.	
Spanish	investors	were	supported	and	financed	by	the	local	governments	in	turn	to	carry	out	
economic	 and	 infrastructure	 projects	 for	 development.	Modernization	manifested	 itself	 in	
different	ways,	for	example	with	the	arrival	of	the	railroad	that	connected	the	Ciénega	with	


















and	 adopted	 a	 position	 of	 “rights	 won".	 Although	 they	were	 not	 granted	 the	majority	 of	





that	 the	 changes	 that	 gave	 origin	 to	 the	 ejidos	 were	 propitiated.	 However,	 productive	
organization,	water	management,	and	the	interrelation	between	communities	and	between	
actors	are	a	continuation	of	the	prevailing	social	relations	of	the	haciendas.	In	fact,	the	ejidos	




























The	biodiversity	 and	 livelihoods	were	 affected	by	 the	 changes	 in	 the	possession	of	
natural	resources.	The	first	non-Indigenous	usufruct	in	the	area	took	place	in	1541,	when	the	
nephew	of	Hernan	Cortés	received	a	Royal	Grant;	later,	King	Carlos	III	created	a	decree	to	use	
Indigenous	 properties	 that	 were	 in	 "dead	 hands”.	 The	 decree	 intended	 to	 stimulate	 the	
economy	as	well	 as	 to	provide	 food	 for	peoples’	 survival	 and	maintenance	 (Castro-Lemus,	




to	 changes	 in	 land	 ownership,	 which	 privileged	 colonizing	 companies.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
communities	were	deprived	of	their	 lands	at	the	mercy	of	new	interpretations	of	the	laws.		
Additionally,	 foreigners	(Spanish),	and	mestizos	were	given	financial	and	 legal	assistance	 in	















After	 the	drainage,	 12,000	hectares	were	 allocated	 to	 the	haciendas,	 and	only	 400	




expropriation	 matter	 enacted	 by	 the	 Colonization	 and	Wasteland	 Laws	 (1883	 and	 1894),	













As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 State’s	 refusal	 to	 restore	 the	 communities’	 possession	 of	 their	
territories,	the	struggle	to	restore	them	began.		Since	the	beginning	of	the	project	to	drain	the	
Ciénega,	 the	 agrarian	 leader	 Joaquín	 de	 la	 Cruz,	 originally	 from	 Naranja,	 had	 promoted,	
without	success,	the	restitution	of	land	to	the	purépecha	communities	affected,	since	he	was	
one	of	the	few	people	who	understood	the	language	in	which	the	laws	had	been	written,	and	





every	year	because	of	stormwater	runoff	ending	up	 in	 the	basin	system.10	 	Simultaneously,	

























States	 (1907-1920)	 and	 from	 there	 he	 participated	 in	 social	 organizations	 linked	 to	 the	









land	and	who	had	maintained	a	constant	 struggle	 to	 recover	 it,	Villa	 Jiménez	entered	 into	
conciliatory	 negotiations	 with	 the	 State.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 negotiated	 with	 the	
landowners	to	affect	the	surrounding	haciendas	and	use	this	route	as	a	safety	valve	for	the	





















1980's	when	mechanization	 came	 into	 the	 area;	 the	 first	 tractors	 replaced	 the	 tronco14,	 a	
technique	that,	in	turn,	had	replaced	the	oxen	yoke.	As	before,	corn	is	still	produced	today,	
only	 now	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 machinery.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 absence	 of	 crop	 rotation	 had	
impoverished	the	land,	and	the	swampy	terrain	required	continuous	maintenance	channels	
that	allow	for	sufficient	water	drainage.	In	essence,	in	the	Ciénega,	techniques	involving	the	
management	 and	 conservation	 of	 the	water	 using	 siltation	 prevail	 (Palerm	 and	Martínez,	
2000),	 and	 is	 now	 run	 by	 the	 new	owners,	 the	ejidatarios.	 But	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 benefits	
obtained,	 the	 use	 of	 machinery	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 channels	 is	 expensive.	
Consequently,	many	channels	have	disappeared,	causing	the	water	to	stagnate	and	affect	the	
crops.	
Transforming	 the	 Ciénega	 was	 a	 modernizing	 action	 that	 generated	 a	 process	
accelerated	by	the	exploitation	of	the	natural	resources	of	the	region,	which	 in	turn	 led	to	
other	 phenomena	 such	 as	 human	 settlements,	 the	 cacique	 struggle	 for	 power,	 conflicts	





and	was	 justified	 by	 taking	 a	 historical	 perspective	 of	 economic	 development.	 Today,	 this	
vision	 prevails,	 and	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 reform	 of	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 which	
intends	 to	 decompose	 the	 ejido	 and	 its	 organizing	 forms	 and	 is	 deemed	 by	 many	 to	 be	
consistent	with	a	logic	that	favours	the	accumulation	of	wealth.	
The	modernization	 project	 reflects	 the	 image	 of	 benefits	 supported	 by	 the	 use	 of	
technology	and	economic	growth,	reaffirming	the	supremacy	of	the	material	and	individual	
values	on	the	collective.	This	neoliberal	policy	requires	that	the	State	extend	its	functions	as	a	
body	 of	 parliament,	 establishing	 agreements	 between	 stakeholders,	 even	 though	 they	




















development	 together	with	 federal	development	plans.	 	Currently,	 the	National	 System	of	
Planning	(SNP)	coordinates	these	actions	through	the	National	Development	Plan	(PND).	This	
means	promoting	 the	 transfer	of	 responsibilities	 from	 federal	and	State	 levels	 to	 the	 local	
level,	 coordinating	 programs,	 policies	 and	 criteria	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 the	
respective	levels.						
For	 its	 part,	 the	 Development	 Plan	 2002-2008	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Michoacán	 (PDEM)	
retained	the	importance	of	the	integral	process	of	democratic	and	participatory	planning	and	
intended	 to	 implement	 its	 planning	 system	 accordingly.	 One	 of	 the	 cornerstones	 of	 the	
PDEM15	was	the	promotion	of	citizen	participation	in	transversal	axes	of	government	policy	
and	 development,	 to	 promote	 self-diagnosis	 and	 alternative	 planning	 activities,	 trying	 to	
articulate	them	with	State	government	agencies.	
Planning	 in	Michoacán	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 State	 System	 of	 Democratic	 Planning	




At	 the	 regional	 level,	 SEPLADE	 was	 coordinated	 with	 SUPLADER	 to	 promote	
development	 programs	 that	 incorporated	 citizens’	 proposals	 following	 a	 bottom-up	
development	 approach.	 As	 for	 the	 municipalities,	 Committees	 of	 Municipal	 Planning	
(COPLADEMUN)	 and	 the	 Municipal	 Council	 for	 Sustainable	 Rural	 Development	 (CMDRS)	
established	new	guidelines	 for	 the	municipal	development	plans.	Within	 the	communities,	
however,	the	organization	of	internal	forums	were	articulated	with	government	institutions	
in	 the	 follow-up	 of	 the	 programs	 of	 community	 development,	 such	 as	 Community	
Development	 Committees	 (CODECO).18	 Fig.	 1.1	 shows	 the	 interrelationships	 between	
institutions	and	strategies,	starting	from	the	community	up	to	the	federation.	
In	 the	 study	area,	CODECO	membership	and	 their	promoters	were	proposed	by	 the	
municipalities,	and	the	works	were	determined	by	the	planning	of	CMDRS	under	an	outline	of	
privileges	 for	 political	 purposes,	which	 in	 turn	were	 sponsored	by	 the	 city	 council.	 Even	 if	




















citizens	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 the	main	works	 and	 programs	 in	 the	 region,	 generating	 a	 self-
sustaining	model	 that	would	decrease	social	 inequality.20	Therefore,	 the	 institutions	of	 the	
State	 and	 federal	 governments	 such	 as	 SEDAGRO21,	 SEPLADE,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	
















Resources	 for	 SUPLADER	 came	 from	 a	 loan	 of	 USD	 120	 million	 requested	 by	 the	












CODECO	planning.	At	 the	regional	 level,	 it	 should	be	coordinating	with	 institutions	such	as	
DDR,	 CONAGUA,	 Secretariat	 of	 Communications	 and	 Public	 Works	 (SCOP),	 SEDESOL,	 and	
others.	
Each	 agency	 of	 the	 federal	 and	 state	 government	 had	 separately	 established	 its	
strategy	and	development	planning	of	the	Zacapu	region.	The	mandate	of	SUPLADER	was	to	
establish	 the	 necessary	 links	 to	 coordinate	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 planned	 development.	 This	
initiative	intended	to	enhance	the	scope	of	regional	projects,	allowing	the	co-investment	of	
different	financial	sources.	For	this	purpose,	the	guidelines	of	SUPLADER	demanded	that	in	
order	 to	 obtain	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 Regional	 Development	 Fund	 (FDR)	 the	 beneficiaries	
should	cover	a	percentage,	which	had	to	be	higher	than	the	35%	investment	of	the	other	levels	
of	the	government	invested.		
From	my	perspective,	 SUPLADER	 introduced	 the	 “leftist”	 approach	of	 the	new	PRD	
government	 in	Michoacán,	 represented	 by	 the	 grandson	 of	 Cárdenas	 del	 Río	 (a	 symbolic	




agenda.	 The	 dynamic	 generated	 from	 these	 conditions	 means	 that	 sometimes	 the	
organization	 for	 the	 development	 incorporates	 the	 planning	 strategies	 with	 “social	
participation”.	However,	this	can	contribute	to	generate	conditions	not	provided	by	the	policy	
of	the	State,	in	which	the	State	intervenes	to	set	planning	priorities.	
Associated	with	SUPLADER	 in	Michoacán,	 regionalization	was	due	 to	a	process	 that	












which	 cover	 different	 areas.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 SUPLADER	 in	 state	 planning	
granted	a	 re-signification	 for	 regional	development,	without	pretending	 that	 the	emerging	













level,	 together	with	 civil	 society	 organizations.	 The	 statutes	 of	 SUPLADER	 established	 that	
decisions	would	be	made	collectively	among	the	members	of	the	SUPLADER.	
SUPLADER	integrated	social	and	private	organizations,	and	the	representation	of	the	
three	 levels	 of	 government,	 and	 intended	 to	 incorporate	 citizen	 participation	 into	 the	













27	A	 region	means	a	geographic	area	defined	by	 its	degree	of	homogeneity	or	heterogeneity	 in	addressing	a	
particular	issue.	Regions	are	not	generic,	closed	areas.	Rather,	they	help	to	understand	the	complexity	of	the	
territory	for	the	purpose	of	intervention.	
28	At	municipal	 level,	 stakeholders	 are	 organized	 in	 the	CMDRS;	 it	 is	 common	 that	 the	 council	 is	 a	 space	of	
confluence	between	communities	through	their	representations	for	resolution	of	issues	of	common	interest.	
	 21	
It	 was	 decided	 that	 the	 subcommittee	 (SUPLADER)	 should	 define	 strategies	 to	
implement	specific	policies	that	serve	as	pillars	of	regional	development,	 involving,	for	this	
purpose,	municipal	presidents	and	officials	of	the	various	institutions	in	the	region	and	other	
organized	 stakeholders.	 This	 “participatory”	 structure	 pretended	 to	 enable	 citizen	
involvement,	 avoiding	 controversies	 in	 the	 regional	 planning	 proposed	 by	 government	
structures.			
SUPLADER	 and	 CMDRS	 considered	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 officials	 of	 the	 inter-
secretarial	 commission,	 which	 represented	 the	 institutions	 at	 state	 and	 federal	 levels.	




Resources	 for	 SUPLADER	 coming	 from	 the	 Regional	 Development	 Fund	 (FDR)29	 were	
considered	as	“seed”	capital,	and	they	would	return	once	capitalized	by	the	project	in	order	





Upon	 receipt	of	 the	 technical	application	of	a	proposed	 investment	with	a	 regional	
impact,	 SUPLADER	 presented	 it	 in	 the	 assembly,	 where	 it	 was	 evaluated,	 hierarchized,	
validated	 and,	 where	 appropriate,	 approved.	 Then,	 the	 technical	 secretary	 of	 SUPLADER	
delivered	 the	 file	 to	 the	 corresponding	 agency	 to	 obtain	 the	 technical	 opinion.	 From	 that	






for	 submission	 of	 project	 proposals	 would	 start	 (Fig.	 1.3).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 receiving	 the	
proposals,	the	process	to	manage	resources	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	regulations	would	

















indirect	 associations	 and	 networks	 established	 among	 the	 groups.	 As	 will	 be	 seen	 later,	
Definition	 of	 the	 axes	 of	 regional	
development	
Call	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	
proposals	
Technical	 validation	 of	 proposals	 by	 the	
normative	department	
Revision	 and	 evaluation	 by	 the	
respective	commission	
	
Presentation	 of	 results	 of	 the	
plenary	revision	
	






Presentation	 before	 assembly	 for	 the	
approval	of	proposals	














municipalities,	 were	 unaware	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 transfer	 and	 operation	 thereof.	 In	
practice,	 the	 representation	 of	 citizens	 in	 SUPLADER	 Zacapu	 was	 based	 on	 the	





















technician	 of	 the	 SEPLADE-Zacapu.	 As	 a	 congressman,	 Gonzalo	 met	 the	 governor	 of	





Gonzalo	 (López,	 2006)	was	 convinced	of	 the	 ideological	 and	political	 importance	of	
class	 struggle,	 one	 of	 the	Marxist	 ideas	 and	 materialistic	 theories	 about	 accumulation	 of	




The	 other	 technician	 of	 SEPLADE	 in	 Zacapu	 was	 René	 Sosa,	 who	 had	 ties	 to	 state	
government.33	Cristi	 from	SPR	Biotecnológicos	supported	René	as	his	assistant;	 in	order	 to	
support	 René,	 Cristi	 interfered	 by	 managing	 some	 requests	 that	 were	 originally	 sent	 to	
SEPLADE	and	SUPLADER.	By	these	means,	René	performed	political	proselytizing	since	early	
2003.	 This	 raised	 the	 discontent	 of	 the	 municipal	 presidents	 of	 Coeneo,	 Purépero,	 and	
Tlazazalca	who	disapproved	the	'interference'	by	an	official	of	SEPLADE	in	their	municipalities.	
Rafael	 Lp	 -	 another	 technician	 of	 SEPLADE	 -	 had	 his	 contacts	 in	 state	 government;	
among	them	was	Julio	Moguel	Viveros,	a	former	professor	at	the	UNAM	in	Mexico	City	and	

























was	 then	 considered	 that	 councils	 could	 also	 promote	 'the	 merits'	 of	 SUPLADER.	 Taking	
advantage	 of	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 involved	 municipalities,	 Rafael	 Lp	 and	 René	 Sosa	
included	 beneficiaries	 in	 SUPLADER	 projects	 -	 even	 some	 close	 relatives	 –	 and,	 as	will	 be	
discussed	below,	these	actions	pre-configured	the	involved	networks.		
Federal	institutions	represented	in	SUPLADER	Zacapu	like	CONAGUA,	SAGARPA,	FIRCO,	
and	 FIRA	were	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 corresponding	 regional	 representation.	 The	 government	
institutions	of	Michoacán	involved	in	SUPLADER	were	SEPLADE,	the	Ministry	of	Agricultural	




Before	 a	project	 could	be	 considered	 viable	with	 SUPLADER,	 it	 should	 comply	with	
certain	conditions	established	in	the	rules	of	operation.	To	obtain	a	favourable	opinion	of	the	
review	 committee	 of	 SUPLADER,	 the	 project	 should	 incorporate	 information	 provided	 by	
specialists	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 project,	 which	 would	 justify	 the	 technical	 and	 economic	
feasibility.	SUPLADER	had	been	consolidated	as	a	complex	space	of	negotiations,	representing	
a	 filter	 to	 define	 who	 entered	 or	 not	 into	 the	 game	 of	 associations	 and	 permeated	 the	
development	 planning	 in	 the	 region.	 If	 a	 player	 wanted	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 participatory	





Gonzalo	 knew	 the	 difficulties	 and	 limitations	 of	 SUPLADER,	 its	 strategy	 for	 the	






SUPLADER’s	 proposal	 for	 the	 Zacapu	 region	 was	 considered	 a	 social,	 productive	 and	
technological	 transformation,	 involving	 the	 launch	 of	 some	 projects	 that	 formed	 the	
Alternative	Agricultural	Model	(MAA).	See	figure	1.5	below.			
The	model	 proposed	 by	 a	 group	 of	 officials	 from	 SEPLADE	 Zacapu	was	 headed	 by	
delegate	Gonzalo.	The	'top-down'	approach	proposed	by	SEPLADE	Zacapu,	representing	the	
perception	 held	 by	 regional	 development	 officials,	 was	 articulated	 in	 coordination	 with	
government	institutions	and	local	stakeholders	from	SUPLADER.	To	implement	MAA	projects,	
the	 collective	 and	 social	 organizing	 of	 the	 participants	 was	 required.	 The	 mobilization	 of	
resources	 intended	 a	 social	 change	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 aim	 was	 that	 regional	 planning	 of	

























The	 self-employment	 project,	 which	 initially	 had	 no	 beneficiaries,	 concerned	 the	
participation	in	training	courses	that	would	trigger	productive	activities	considered	successful.	
Later	we	will	see	that	instead	it	involved	the	political	training	of	actors	linked	to	the	network	







the	 presidents	 to	 promote	 them	 in	 the	 communities.	 SEPLADE	meanwhile	 highlighted	 the	
benefits	of	the	model	in	the	ejidos	and	organizations	in	the	region,	promoting	the	organization	
and	collective	participation,	 indicating	 that	 to	be	considered	as	beneficiaries	of	MAA,	 they	
should	develop	a	project	with	regional	impact	and	submit	it	to	SUPLADER.	
From	a	 'top-down'	development	perspective	MAA	appeared	a	 coherent	 and	 logical	
















that	 was	 expected	 to	 transform	 the	 political	 and	 social	 conditions	 took	 place	 in	 the	
government	of	Michoacán.	The	new	State	government,	represented	by	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel,	
	28	




However,	 in	 practice	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 participatory	 intervention	 model	
appeared	to	be	complicated,	as	 it	was	contradicted	by	traditional	forms	of	top-down	State	
that	 applied	 a	 rigid	 definition	 of	 implementation	 mechanisms.	 Thus,	 the	 participation	 of	
stakeholders	 from	 civil	 society	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 field	 of	 social	 practices	 such	 as	 the	
legitimation	 of	 the	 planning	 and	 policy	 of	 the	 government.	 SUPLADER,	 claiming	 to	 be	
participatory,	 established	 mechanisms	 to	 coordinate	 actions	 associated	 with	 a	 territorial	
space	without	first	considering	the	lifeworlds	of	local	actors	and	their	communities.	When	one	
intervenes	 in	 local	 arenas,	 negotiation	 with	 stakeholders	 is	 required	 through	 federal	
institutions,	municipalities,	communities,	and	the	networks	that	are	present	in	each	region.	In	
this	 sense,	a	planning	process	 that	pretends	 to	modify	 the	 lifeworlds	of	 the	 involved	 local	
actors	must	be	agreed	upon	from	the	beginning	and	thus	be	bottom-up,	rather	than	following	
the	top-down	State	model.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Zacapu	 region,	 the	 Alternative	 Agricultural	 Model	 (MAA)	 was	
identified	as	a	strategy	to	support	the	local	vision	of	development.	However,	the	design	and	
validation	 of	 this	 strategy	 did	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 local	 actors’	 perspectives,	 their	





































There	 appeared	 to	 be	 no	 records	 of	 hydroponic	 farming	 in	 the	Ciénega	 of	 Zacapu	




In	 order	 to	 encourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 SUPLADER	
recommended	that	the	local	councils	should	be	the	ones	to	boost	the	consolidation	of	the	first	




form	a	 SPR,	which	 established	 that	 government	officers	were	not	 allowed	 to	 be	 involved.	
	30	
Another	condition	was	that	candidates	for	the	membership	of	an	SPR	should	be	involved	in	












requirements	 requested	 by	 SUPLADER	 to	 implement	 the	 project,	 the	members	 would	 be	
considered	as	SUPLADER’s	beneficiaries.		
The	 Asociación	was	 in	 charge	 of	 managing	 the	 resources	 among	 the	 government	






officials	of	 the	Zacapu	SEPLADE,	and	 the	political	negotiation	 carried	out	by	 the	municipal	








This	 section	 describes	 the	 processes	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 SPR	 Laredo,	 located	 in	 the	

















Starting	 from	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 operation	 rules	 of	 federal	 programs	 in	 charge	 of	








The	 formation	 of	 SPR	 Laredo	 accomplished	 several	 objectives	 for	 its	 members;	
furthermore,	 it	was	expected	 that	 the	SPR	would	produce	 its	own	alternatives	 in	order	 to	
negotiate	resources	 from	the	government’s	 institutions.	The	activities	within	the	SPR	were	
























projects.	The	constitution	of	an	SPR	would	be	a	way	 to	give	 them	something	 in	 return	 for	
support	 for	 my	 research.	 To	 create	 the	 SPR	 Laredo,	 the	 public	 notary	 required	 the	
authorization	 by	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 (SRE).39	 To	 obtain	 authorization,	 each	
member	taking	part	in	the	SPR	needed	to	provide	an	official	ID,	a	copy	of	their	birth	certificate	
and	a	document	accrediting	him/her	as	an	agricultural	producer.		











my	 perspective,	 the	members	 choose	me	 as	 SPR	 president	 because	 of	my	 availability	 and	
previous	 participation.	 Agreeing	 to	 collaborate	 with	 the	 SPR,	 required	 critical	 reflection,	




in	 charge	 of	 the	 notary	 office	 verbally	 stated	 that	 the	 capital	 stock,	 built	 from	members’	
contributions,	was	non-existent,	and	said	that	this	did	not	matter	since	it	was	only	specified	
in	the	government’s	nominal	requirements	–	which	were	usually	not	fulfilled.	
A	 similar	 process	 was	 performed	 for	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 Finance	 and	 Public	 Credit	
(Secretaría	de	Hacienda	y	Crédito	Público	or	SHCP)	for	which	the	procedure	was	carried	out	at	




was	 not	made	 totally	 clear	 to	 the	 SPR	members.	 After	 ten	working	 days,	 the	 Federal	 Tax	
Registry	(RFC)	was	obtained	(with	the	SPR’s	address	for	tax	purposes).	SHCP	personnel	would	















different	 sources.	 In	 this	 way,	 digital	 systematization	 facilitated	 intervention	 into	 the	
collectives,	violating	in	a	certain	way	their	autonomy.	
In	2003,	the	SPR	Laredo	participated	in	the	organization	of	the	Expoferia	Coeneo.	The	














were	presented	 to	meet	each	project,	 then	 the	alternatives	discussed	upon	which	 the	SPR	
would	decide	to	continue	or	not	with	the	project.	
The	actions	carried	out	by	the	Laredo	group	were	brought	to	the	direct	attention	of	
the	 municipal	 government,	 which	 was	 at	 the	 time	 backed	 by	 the	 Partido	 Revolucionario	





















gave	 the	 animals	 to	 people	 close	 to	 the	municipality.	 In	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 the	 SPR	
Coenenses	was	 formed	by	officials	 and	 family	members	of	Coeneo’s	 council,	which	at	 the	
same	time	hindered	the	participation	of	the	Laredo	SPR.		Likewise,	the	organic	fertilisers	were	


















hectare	 each)	 in	 the	 Numarán	municipality	 in	Michoacán	 (Bajío	 Region).	 The	 greenhouse	
beneficiaries	were	advised	by	 the	business	consulting	 firm	 led	by	 JLB	 (or	“El	Gachupín”)	of	











of	 this	 situation,	 the	 beneficiaries	 did	 not	 continue	with	 the	 start	 of	 the	 project,	 and	 the	
greenhouse	project	in	Numarán	failed.		
Meanwhile	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 Region,	 the	 SEPLADE	 delegate	 stated	 that	 the	 State	
government	had	given	 the	green	 light	 to	authorize	 resources	 for	 ten	 SPRS	 to	 test	how	 the	




greenhouse;	 Zacapu	 and	 Jiménez	 would	 have	 two).	 The	 beneficiaries	 were	 expected	 to	









project	 to	 be	 re-allocated	 to	 the	 Ciénega	 greenhouse	 project.	 The	 secretary	 of	 SEDAGRO,	
Silvano	 Aureoles,	 then	 committed	 himself,	 through	 a	 letter	 of	 intent,	 to	 allocate	 USD	
200,000.00	for	the	Asociación,	in	support	of	the	greenhouse	project	in	the	Zacapu	region.		




the	 Zacapu	 project	 -	 at	 least	 on	 paper.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 eligible	 to	 receive	 the	 resources	
committed,	 the	 Asociación	 should	 be	 established.	 Also,	 to	 access	 the	 resources	 from	










45	 Alianza	 required	 members	 experience	 in	 greenhouse	 production.	 The	 authorized	 amount	 for	 equipment	





JLB’s	 proposal	 considered	 new	 funds	 could	 be	 committed	 by	 the	 government	
institutions	he	had	relations	with,	and	increased	the	investment	to	USD	220,000.	SUPLADER	














who	 inspired	 confidence	when	he	 spoke	using	professional	 language,	 accompanied	by	 the	
appropriate	 gestures	 and	 body	 language.	 His	 firm	 promoted	 the	 technological	 change	 to	
















would	 be	 managed	 directly	 by	 the	 members.	 This	 scenario	 implied	 that,	 during	 the	
amortization	 of	 the	 capital,	 the	 members	 would	 appoint	 JLB’s	 firm	 to	 manage	 the	
greenhouses.	By	using	the	argument	of	filling	the	technological	gap	in	the	technical	operations	
																																																						


























demand,	 the	 firm	 leaned	 towards	 the	 support	 of	 SEPLADE’s	 regional	 delegate.	 JLB	 openly	
expressed	 his	 confidence:	 “Although	 he	 has	 a	 different	 professional	 background	 [doctor],	
Gonzalo	[SEPLADE’s	delegate]	is	interested	in	the	project	and	has	in-depth	technical	knowledge	
of	agriculture”	(JLB,	18/08/2003,	SEPLADE	office).	During	the	informative	meetings,	Zacapu’s	
SEPLADE	 official	 often	 invited	 the	 project’s	 participants	 to	 clarify	 any	 queries	 they	 had	
regarding	the	project	with	the	JLB’s	firm	personnel,	saying:	“So	you	don’t	have	to	ask	me	later”	

































would	 lay	 the	 productive	 and	 organizing	 foundation	 for	 local	 development.	 Although	 the	
SEPLADE-02	 planners	 believed	 that	 ideological	 formation	 among	 the	 members	 was	
fundamental	 to	 accomplish	 unity	 in	 the	 project,	 this	 was	 not	 possible	 because	 the	 MAA	
projects	 were	 not	 associated	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 negotiations	 between	 the	 involved	
networks	caused	actors	with	dissimilar	approaches	to	join.	As	a	result,	there	were	mechanical	
engineers,	managers,	teachers,	cattle	farmers,	auto	parts	sellers,	agricultural	workers,	social	
leaders	 and	 housewives,	 among	 others,	 in	 the	Asociación.	 Cognitive	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	
tomato	production	showed	how	planners	(SEPLADE-SUPLADER)	gave	preference	to	networks	
before	the	feasibility	of	the	project.	Many	members	of	the	SPRs	did	not	have	the	resources	







of	 the	 SPR	 called	 Productos	 Coenenses.	 In	 90%	 of	 the	 SPR’s	 there	 was	 participation	 from	
government	officials.	SEPLADE	and	members	of	SUPLADER,	especially	those	representatives	of	
the	local	councils,	approved	that	strategy,	and,	by	being	both	judge	and	jury,	they	hindered	

































This	 project	 [greenhouse	 project]	 is	 meant	 for	 the	 beneficiaries	 who	 contribute	 a	
minimum	of	30%	[USD	45,000.00]	as	SPR,	with	the	intention	of	managing	a	revolving	fund	










This	 process	modified	 the	 initial	 proposal	 of	 building	 ten	 pilot	 sheds	 by	 spreading	




for	 choosing	 which	 SPRs	 would	 take	 part	 in	 each	 stage.	 The	 resources	 “committed”	 by	
SEDAGRO	for	building	ten	greenhouses,	expressed	in	a	Letter	of	Intent	to	the	Asociación	as	a	
beneficiary	and	for	an	amount	of	USD	200,000,	was	now	being	contested.	There	was	ambiguity	





















the	 question	 about	 this	 option,	 stating	 that	 the	 program	was	 not	 liable	when	 authorizing	
higher	amounts	(such	as	the	ones	expected	for	the	project).	They	claimed	that	until	that	date	
(22/08/2003),	 the	 previous	 year’s	 funds	 that	 had	 been	 released,	 had	 not	 been	 yet	 used;	



















the	 interest	 of	 certain	 actors	 who	 decided	 to	 promote	 the	 negotiations	 through	 the	
Asociación’s	representation	and	not	with	the	SPRs.		
In	order	to	formally	create	the	Asociación,	there	was	a	meeting	on	September	23,	2003	
at	 SEPLADE’s	 headquarters,	 in	 which	 I	 participated.	 Julio	 César	 had	 already	 requested	 the	
registry	at	the	SRE	for	the	corporate	entity	of	the	Unión	de	Invernaderos	Ruta	de	la	Libertad	
USPR.	During	the	assembly,	the	representatives	of	the	SPR	arrived.	Their	appearance	varied	
















Marijo	 Espinoza-Zacapu	 Azteca	 Saul-Santa	Gertrudis	
Piedad	Chiquita	 Irma	and	Armando-Zacapu	 Maldonado	 Jesús-Zacapu	
Huaniqueo	 Norberto-Huaniqueo	 Purépero	 Esperanza-Purépero	
Heredia	 Heredia-Churintzio	 El	Fresno	 Manuel-Puruandiro	
La	Mesa	 Avelino-Churintzio	 Jiménez	 Lino-Jiménez	
Los	Sauces	 Pedro-Churintzio	 Hortipure	 Martín-Purépero	
Provech	 Rodolfo-Churintzio	 Biotecnológicos	 Julio,	Cristi-Zacapu	
Tomates	 Andrade-Tlazazalca	 Los	Pinos	 Ampa-Los	Espinos	
del	Campo	 Jaime	-Santa	Gertrudis	 Comanja	 Pancho	-	Comanja	
Delicias	 Manuel	-	Zacapu	 Bajo	Invernadero	 Salas	–	Zacapu	
Puerta	Chica	 Mare,	Gracian-Zacapu	 Laredo	 Fidencio	-	Laredo	
Purépechas	 Abelardo	–	Copándaro	 Agroindustriales	 Zepeda	-	Coeneo	














(SPR	 Purépero)	 was	 considered	 as	 a	 natural	 born	 leader	 by	 some	 of	 the	 assistants;	 she	
represented	20	members	of	the	municipality	of	Purépero	that	at	the	same	time	were	taking	
part	 in	 a	municipal	 housing	 project	 boosted	 by	 the	 PRD	 and	 René	 (SEPLADE’s	 technician).	
Gracian	 represented	 the	 SPR	 Puerta	 Chica	 that	 was	 formed	 by	 the	 Gutiérrez	 family	 who	
worked	in	a	portion	of	land	located	at	Puerta	Chica	in	Zacapu.	Gracian	had	only	a	small	role,	
his	 sister	Mare	 was	 the	 real	 representative	 of	 the	 SPR;	 she	 was	 devoted	 to	 private	 basic	
education	and	she	leased	a	small	and	central	premise	from	Víctor	(SPR	Maldonado).	Mare’s	
husband	worked	at	a	 factory	 in	the	 industrial	complex	of	Zacapu	and	his	sister	managed	a	
restaurant	 located	 downtown.	 Mare’s	 father	 acted	 as	 treasurer	 in	 an	 SPR	 for	 milk	
pasteurization,	 but	 there	 were	 disputes	 and	 this	 SPR	 closed	 its	 doors.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	
understand	the	historicity	of	the	SPR	participants	and	their	networks,	the	above	description	
serves	as	an	introduction	of	the	actors	and	their	groups.	There	was	a	relationship	between	
them,	which	was	prior	 to	 the	project,	 and	which	ultimately	would	have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
creation	of	factions	and	associations.	
Don	 Saúl,	 who	 had	 organized	 the	 SPR	 Azteca	 and	 enlisted	 his	 family	 in	 it,	 listened	
attentively	 and	 kept	 the	 proposals	 and	 moods	 of	 the	 participants.	 He	 did	 not	 believe	 in	
projects	boosted	by	the	government,	as	he	did	not	think	they	would	give	solutions	for	regional	




killed	each	other	 in	order	 to	obtain	 the	 funds	offered	by	 the	government.	He	said:	“When	
words	are	insufficient,	weapons	shall	arise”.		
Jaime	 (Sabor	 del	 Campo)	 was	 Saúl’s	 nephew	 and	 business	 administrator,	 and	 he	






The	 SPRs	Deyna,	Maldonado	 and	 Cortijo	Nuevo,	 represented	 by	 Chema,	 Jesús	 and	
Trujillo	 respectively,	 kept	 a	 low	 profile	 at	 the	 meeting.	 They	 held	 positions	 at	 Zacapu’s	





hall’s	 sports	promoter;	 Jesús	 (Maldonado)	 as	 the	administrative	head,	 and	Trujillo	 (Cortijo	
Nuevo)	 had	 under	 his	 command	 the	municipality’s	 department	 of	 rubbish	 collection.	 The	
veterinarian	 Espinoza	 (Marijo)	 was	 related	 to	 the	 town	 hall’s	 network	 and	 was	 a	 local	
businessperson;	being	a	close	friend	of	Chema’s	he	had	invited	him	to	the	project.	Chema,	
Jesús,	 Trujillo,	 Armando,	 together	 with	 Irma	 (Piedad	 Chiquita),	 Espinoza	 (Marijo)	 and	 the	
members	of	Puerta	Chica	had	been	visiting	each	other	for	some	time	already.	There	were	also	
Mare	and	Estela	(Puerta	Chica)	who	had	been	acquainted	with	Ampa	and	her	sister	Malla	(Los	
Pinos)	 since	 they	were	 classmates.	 The	 SPRs	 linked	with	 the	municipality	 of	 Zacapu	were	
formed	shortly	before	this	assembly,	however,	among	its	members	were	links	with	other	SPRs	
which	 participated	 in	 the	 project	 such	 as	 Los	 Pinos,	 Marijo,	 Puerta	 Chica	 and	 La	 Piedad	










Once	 the	 word	 was	 given	 to	 the	 moderator,	 the	 third	 point	 of	 the	 agenda	 was	
addressed:	the	election	of	a	president	for	the	Asociación.	Gonzalo	suggested	that	a	capable	
representative	should	be	chosen,	one	that	was	skilled	in	leading	it	successfully	through	the	
negotiations	 and	 the	 project’s	 consolidation.	 I	 was	 nominated	 in	 a	 shortlist	 of	 three	
candidates,	alongside	Heredia	and	another	member.	Heredia	obtained	11	votes	against	the	









51	Lino	 represented	 the	group	 Jiménez;	 the	PRD	ruled	 Jiménez	and	he	had	been	public	 trustee.	His	 link	with	
“Chacho”	[municipal	president	of	Jiménez]	favoured	him	to	be	in	the	first	ten	SPRs.		
52	Ampa	had	an	unfinished	degree	in	administration	and	had	been	a	students’	leader	during	the	creation	of	the	











Heredia’s	 appointment	 was	 a	 strategy	 of	 Gonzalo	 who	 sought	 to	 position	 himself	 at	 the	
conference	table.	The	relationship	between	Heredia	and	Gonzalo	went	beyond	the	Asociación	
via	SUPLADER,	since	Heredia	was	also	a	member	of	SUPLADER	representing	an	NGO	and	the	
biological	 fertilizers	 SPR	 (MAA).	 Lino	was	 a	 good	 speaker	 so	 he	 could	 be	 useful	 in	 certain	
occasions,	 and	 Ampa	 had	 demonstrated	 to	 have	 administrative	 expertise	 -and	 also	 could	
perform	well	 in	public.	 In	all	 these	cases,	the	existing	network	supported	and	elected	 local	
celebrities	in	the	Asociación’s	positions	with	whom	they	identified.		
When	writing	and	transcribing	the	meeting’s	reports	for	 its	subsequent	signature,	a	
number	 of	 inconsistencies	 were	 detected.	 The	 SPR	 Coenenses	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	
Asociación’s	deed,	although	they	were	present	at	the	meeting.	The	SPR	Maldonado	had	been	



























of	 the	 first	 20	 greenhouses.	 The	 SPRs	 all	 wanted	 to	 be	 considered	 among	 the	 first	 20	
associations,	 which	 would	 guarantee	 access	 to	 the	 funds	 authorized	 by	 SUPLADER	 and	
SEDAGRO	for	the	project.	This	prompted	the	actions	in	pursuit	of	the	money,	but	such	“going	
for	the	dough”	also	caused	inevitable	conflict	among	SPRs.		
After	 having	 looked	 through	 the	 Asociación's	 file,	 SEPLADE	 Zacapu	 presented	 their	
selection	of	the	first	20	SPRs	that	would	receive	funding	from	SEPLADE	and	SEDAGRO,	leaving	
behind	 the	 following	 eight	 SPRs:	 Movimiento	 ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres,	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 La	
Jabonera,	 Deyna,	 Maldonado,	 La	 Piedad	 Chiquita,	 Purépechas	 and	 Laredo.	 Given	 this	
situation,	the	eight	SPRs	raised	the	question	as	to	the	selection	criteria	applied	by	SEPLADE.	
Gonzalo	stated	that	in	the	first	phase	these	SPRs	had	been	prioritized	in	order	to	stimulate	the	
development	 of	 their	 municipalities.	 With	 the	 Asociación’s	 creation,	 the	 number	 had	
increased	 to	 28	 greenhouses	 of	 half	 a	 hectare	 each.	 However,	 only	 20	 SPRs	 would	 have	
authorized	resources.	The	10	initial	groups	proposed	by	their	city	councils,	were	joined	by	10	
SPRs	 more,	 backed	 by	 the	 SEPLADE.	 Although	 the	 other	 eight	 groups	 were	 part	 of	 the	
Asociación,	 they	were	excluded	 in	 the	allocation	of	 resources.	When	new	applications	and	
groups	were	included	in	the	Asociación,	appealing	to	SUPLADER	regulations	to	be	considered	
as	civil	partners,	funding	policies	started	to	be	disputed.	This	led	to	conflict	and	negotiation,	





This	 chapter	 has	 described	 the	 politicized	 organizing	 processes	 used	 to	 implement	 the	
greenhouse	 project	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 Ciénega	 region.	 This	 way	 of	 promoting	 top-down	










‘Development’,	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 project,	 has	 different	 interpretations.	 Initially,	
SUPLADER	considered	to	favour	participating	councils,	and	thus	ensure	the	construction	of	10	
greenhouses	in	the	first	phase.	Greenhouses	would	be	managed	by	the	beneficiaries	of	each	




logic,	 the	 suggested	 model	 of	 extension	 meant	 that	 groups	 interested	 in	 replicating	 the	




the	 JLB	 firm,	 which	 was	 clearly	 after	 the	 money	 (la	 lana)	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 by	




by	 displaying	 repertoires	 and	 resources	 that	 made	 them	 look	 indispensable	 -	 particularly	






SPR’s	 members	 often	 became	 involved	 without	 too	 much	 knowledge	 about	 the	 project’s	
objectives,	or	the	tomato	farming	production	process.	Their	incorporation	primarily	obeyed	








to	 the	 Asociación.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 there	 were	 28	 collectives	 or	 SPRs	 and	 several	
individual	projects,	one	for	each	involved	SPR.		All	these	actors,	including	the	20	enlisted	SPRs,	
were	trying	to	benefit	from	the	“dough”,	together	with	JLB’s	firm,	town	halls,	officials	and	their	




at	 stake.	 Nevertheless,	 JLB’s	 firm	 preferred	 to	 shortcut	 negotiations	with	 the	 Asociación’s	
management	committee	in	order	to	get	a	strong	grip	on	the	negotiations.		
I	therefore	agree	with	Long	and	Van	der	Ploeg	(1989)	and	Long	(2001)	who	state	that	
the	 inclusion	of	external	elements	 that	have	 influence	over	actors’	 livelihoods	 is	bound	 to	




actors’	 understandings,	 interests	 and	 values	 are	 opposed	 to	 one	 another.	 Knowledge,	
dilemmas	 and	 controversies	 are	 captured	 in	 this	 arena,	 represented	 in	 the	 intervention	
processes	by	documents,	regulations,	applications	or	written	statements.	All	of	this	is	imbued	











hence	 looked	 for	 alternative	 funding	 through	Alianza.	Power	 differences	 and	 conflicts	 are	
evident	 as	 the	 SPRs	 are	 linked	 to	 government	 agencies,	 municipalities,	 communities	 and	
external	agents	(e.g.	JLB’s	firm).	This	ensemble	of	actors	and	resources	is	driven	by	networks.	
In	my	description	of	their	practices,	I	show	the	multiplicity	of	actions	and	interfaces	between	
the	actors.	Also,	 as	 I	 show	 through	 the	 case	of	 La	 Jabonera,	opposition	of	other	networks	
tended	to	obstruct	processes	related	to	the	greenhouse	project.	The	chapter	also	describes	
how	the	various	actors	shield	off	resources	of	projects	intended	for	development,	protecting	
them	 through	 complex	 regulations	 and	 safeguards.	 JLB’s	 firm	 comes	 in	 to	offer	 their	well-












the	 Program	 for	 Countryside	 Alliance	 (Alianza	 para	 el	 Campo	 or	 Alianza).53	 After	 the	
Asociación	had	revised	the	rules	of	operation	for	managing	the	resources	of	Alianza,	JLB’S	firm	







has	 its	 origin	 in	 the	 Law	 of	 Sustainable	 Rural	 Development.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 Livestock,	 Rural	
Development,	Fisheries	and	Food	(SAGARPA)	established	the	standards	of	the	Alianza	program	based	on	Rural	
Development	Districts	(DDR)	and	Centres	for	Rural	Development	Support	(CADER).	
54	 Rural	 Investment	 Projects	 (PAPIR)	 and	 the	 Capacity	 Building	 Program	 in	 Rural	 Areas	 (PRODESCA);	 the	 first	


























JLB’S	 firm	was	 financed	 in	 this	 way,	 since	 only	 data	 from	 his	 collaborator	 Lira	 was	





























the	National	Water	 Commission	 (CONAGUA)	which	 stated	 the	 amount	 of	 cubic	meters	 of	





project	was	 cloned	 -	meaning	 that	 only	 the	 name	 of	 the	 SPR	 that	 appeared	 in	 the	 digital	











data	 for	 the	 SPR,	 though	 the	 outline	 format	 and	 information	 of	 the	 INEGI	 municipal	
environment	were	the	same.	Unfortunately,	Lira	insisted	in	charging	the	negotiation	fees	even	
before	 JLB’S	 firm	 had	 completed	 the	 job,	 showing	 the	 letter	 signed	 by	 the	 Asociación’s	
president	and	addressed	to	each	representative	of	the	eight	SPR.	Once	the	USD	150	were	paid,	
Lira	issued	a	receipt.	The	receipt	was	quite	informal	since	it	was	handwritten	and	Lira	signed	

































negotiations.	 It	 aimed	 to	 involve	 the	 resources	 of	 Alianza	 as	 a	 guarantee	 to	 solve	 an	















The	 next	 day,	 another	 objection	was	made.	 Cristi	 urgently	 came	 looking	 for	me	 to	
inform	me	that,	apparently,	my	property	did	not	meet	the	required	dimensions	of	20	meters	
wide	 and	 that	 I	 should	 check	 that	with	 Lira.	A	 few	days	before,	 I	 had	 confirmed	 this	 field	
measurements	as	20	meters	wide	(although	my	property	measured	19.89	meters,	only	11	cm	
less	 than	was	 required).	 Therefore,	 it	would	 be	 necessary	 to	 draw	 another	 sketch,	 obtain	
another	property	title,	anew	permission	by	CONAGUA	and	a	new	endorsement	of	the	collective	

























made	 by	 JLB’S	 firm	 for	 each	 SPR.	 The	 SPR	 representative	would	 collect	 the	 documentation	
requested,	and	it	was	common	that	the	all	members	of	the	SPR	would	attend	the	process	to	
complete	it	to	ensure	that	they	would	not	have	to	travel	back	to	the	communities	for	missing	












































Mexican	State,	and	was	associated	with	existing	references.	 	 In	 this	way,	 the	community	 included	 features	








belonged	 to	 another	 demarcation	 of	 CADER;	 the	 file	 of	 La	 Jabonera	 would	 have	 to	 be	
submitted	to	the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	However,	the	operating	rules	of	Alianza	did	not	
specify	that	municipalities	should	support	an	application.	The	CADER	of	Tanganccuaro	insisted	














although	 the	 beneficiary	 was	 committed	 to	 contribute	 with	 the	 specified	 amount	 -	 thus	
following	 Alianza’s	 guidelines.	 This	 caused	 arguments	 between	 Rafa	 and	 the	 municipal	
president	of	Coeneo.	
When	 I	 interviewed,	 together	 with	 some	 members	 of	 SPR	 Laredo,	 the	 municipal	
president	of	Coeneo	(Raúl)	and	explained	the	benefits	that	the	greenhouse	would	have	for	





individuals,	 upon	 noticing	 the	 profitable	 activity	 of	 the	 priest,	 invested	 in	 the	 same,	
bringing	in	bees	that	competed	and	damaged	the	ones	of	the	priest.	This	activity	then	
stopped	 being	 profitable	 for	 him.	 Another	 case,	 the	 Agua	 Caliente	 [mushrooms]	
greenhouse	 supported	by	 the	 same	municipality:	 once	 it	was	working	 and	producing,	
several	people	interested	in	producing	mushrooms	emerged,	which,	without	a	doubt,	will	
flood	 the	 local	market.	 The	 same	 happened	with	 the	 fattening	 of	 calves	 for	meat	 in	
several	communities	of	the	municipality,	and	now	it	stopped	being	a	good	business	due	
to	 the	 saturation	 of	 the	 regional	market.	 It	 is	 better	 that	 the	 tile	 producer	 does	 not	









to	 the	 next	 town	 hall	 meeting.	 That	 day,	 and	 after	 listening	 to	 that	 request,	 the	 council	





Municipal	 Development	 Plan.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 municipality	 reviewed	 the	 beneficiary’s	
records	and	then	consulted	with	the	ejido	authority.	After	this,	feasibility	of	the	project	was	
reasserted	and	 resources	were	granted.	When/if	 the	ejido	was	 involved	 in	using	collective	
resources,	 the	 ejido	 commissioners,	 the	 vigilance	 councils	 or	 municipal	 authorities	 would	
intervene	as	the	trustees.	
Meanwhile,	trustee	Elsa	(from	Coeneo)	did	not	recognize	El	Campeón	of	SPR	Laredo	as	




person	 interested	 had	worked	 in	 peace	 and	 in	 harmony	with	 the	 community.	 Finally,	 the	
trustee	acknowledged	the	inclusion	of	El	Campeón	thanks	to	the	intervention	of	Rafa,	who	
was	a	 recognized	 trader	 in	Coeneo,	as	well	as	 the	Ruíz	and	Lagunas	 families	 (the	 trustee's	
families)	who	were	friends	with	each	other.	Obtaining	the	guarantees	involved	political	action	























associated	agencies.	 The	absence	of	 the	 legal	personality	of	 JLB’S	 firm	contrasted	with	 the	
constitutional	requirements	requested	for	the	SPR	by	the	involved	instances,	as	JLB’S	firm	did	
not	 exist	 legally.	 The	 State	 facilitated	 these	 mechanisms	 and	 even	 promoted	 them,	
establishing	ambiguous	regulations	 that,	 in	practice,	were	salvable	 to	private	advisers	who	


















and	 tedious,	 given	 the	 little	 legible	 handwriting,	 and	 sometimes	 incomplete	 information.	
Entering	 the	 information	 into	 the	 computer	 system,	 however,	 enabled	 to	 compare	 the	
information	 with	 large	 databases	 from	 other	 government	 instances	 such	 as	 PROCAMPO,	




























independent.	 Rojas	 then	 interrupted	Donaciano	 for	 a	moment	 and	 asked	 him	 to	 properly	
attend	El	Campeón.	By	that	moment,	Abelardo	(SPR	Purépechas)	was	approached	by	Lira,	who	
had	noticed	 the	attention	given	 to	El	Campeón	 and	expressing	his	dissatisfaction	with	 the	
apparent	 attention	 he	 received.	 Rojas	 emphasized	 El	 Campeón	 was	 an	 agent	 of	 the	















began.	 As	 the	 conflict	 grew,	 El	Campeón	was	 identified	 as	 leader	 of	 the	movement,	 receiving	 threats	 and	
pressures.	El	Campeón	relates:	“I	was	arrested	because	of	being	identified	as	a	leader	[I	do	not	consider	myself	
a	 leader].	Since	 I	was	tortured	and	threatened	of	death,	 I	didn't	complain,	 I	 remained	silent.	Then,	 I	 forgot	
about	the	beatings	and	I	got	Goosebumps	seeing	800	people	cooperating	to	pay	the	bail	outside	the	delegation.	





which	 attended	 the	 CADER	 located	 in	 Zacapu.	 The	 SPR	Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	
represented	by	Margarita	did	not	present	any	documents	for	the	greenhouse	project;	they	
had	more	interest	in	the	mushroom	project.	









authority.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 get	 the	 SPR's	 documents	 admitted,	 the	municipal	 president	 of	
Tlazazalca65	went	 to	 the	CADER	 in	Tangancícuaro	 to	 testify	he	had	granted	permission,	but	
CADER'S	 official	 declined	 the	 document	 arguing	 that	 Alianza's	 terms	 specified	 the	 water	
authorization	should	come	from	CONAGUA.		
Although	 the	 operational	 rules	 in	 Alianza	 program	 were	 established,	 there	 was	
evidence	 that	 those	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 them	 at	 CADER	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	
interpret	them	in	such	way	that	they	could	support	or	reject	applications	according	their	own	













and	obligations	were	established	 for	 all	 partners.	 Yet,	 inside	 the	newly	 formed	Asociación	
there	 were	 different	 perceptions	 and	 purposes:	 for	 the	 SPRs	 it	 formed	 a	 mechanism	 for	

















400	 from	 each	 organized	 SPR	 with	 it	 (arguing	 that	 he	 could	 obtain	 resources	 from	 the	
government	in	order	to	build	the	greenhouses).	However,	once	his	strategy	had	shown	not	to	
be	effective	in	one	State,	he	had	moved	to	other	States	and	again	worked	together	with	the	
officials	 in	 charge.	 Despite	 these	 facts	 the	 Asociación	 recognized	 JLB’s	 ability	 to	 dazzle	
resources	as	Lino	(Asociación‘s	secretary)	said:	
	






government	 funds	 would	 serve	 to	 endorse	 a	 loan	 from	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	
greenhouses	 provider.	 Now	 they	 stated	 the	marketeer	would	 follow	 that	 financing	 route;	
while	for	the	project,	it	was	proposed	to	open	a	trust	fund	to	deposit	the	money	authorized	











payment	of	USD	150.	For	 this	purpose,	a	 form	used	by	 the	 trust	obtained	 from	the	BBVA-
Bancomer	 bank	 adapted	 to	 the	 Asociación	 and	 the	 resources	 SEDAGRO	 promised	 were	
presented.	 There	 were	 doubts	 about	 the	 trust	 JLB	 proposed	 for	 the	Asociación,	 involving	
governmental	offices.	On	September	9,	2003	a	representation	of	the	Asociación	went	to	the	
























The	Asociación	 consulted	about	 the	 trust	 fund	with	René	 from	FOMICH.	The	official	
offered	to	review	the	trust	documents	and	deliver	his	observations	as	soon	as	possible.	Lino	











However,	not	all	 the	 institutions	enrolled	 in	 the	project	considered	 JLB’s	 leadership	
appropriate.	Rogelio	(from	FIRCO),	after	a	meeting	in	Zacapu,	would	later	say	that	there	was	

















































presented	 herself	 without	 being	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Los	 Pinos	 SPR.	 This	 caused	 conflicts	 in	
Ampa's	mind,	because	from	the	Asociación’s	perspective	she	had	been	foolish	when	she	was	
appointed	 as	 the	 Asociación's	 treasurer	 without	 being	 a	 member	 of	 an	 SPR.	 Outside	 the	
Asociación's	assembly,	with	the	consent	of	Ampa	and	the	managing	committee,	a	solution	was	




















signatures	 of	 the	 three	 SEDAGRO	 officials	 appeared	 to	 be	 missing.	 It	 was	 signed	 by	 the	






been	 reviewed	 by	 SEDAGRO's	 legal	 department.	 JLB	 supposed	 that	 the	 document’s	
management	 (after	being	signed)	could	easily	be	paid	by	the	state	treasury	by	moving	the	
resources	committed	to	the	Asociación	by	SEDAGRO	to	the	Trust.	Apparently	JLB’S	firm	were	












The	 registration	 process	 described	 for	 Alianza	 corresponds	 with	 federal	 policies.	 State	
planning	seem	linear,	developing	in	stages	and	with	a	scope	aimed	to	keep	continuity.	Despite	
the	regulations,	however,	the	officers	in	charge	(for	example	at	CADER)	are	shown	to	apply	
personal	 and	 ambiguous	 criteria	 for	 the	 admission	 of	 SPRs.	 Informal	 relations	 with	
departmental	 officials	 appear	more	 relevant,	 often	 bypassing	 bureaucratic	 hierarchies.	 An	











firm,	 especially,	 was	 relevant	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 project	 because	 of	 the	 firm’s	
acquaintance	 with	 networks	 that	 facilitated	 the	 processing	 of	 the	 applications	 and	 the	
adequate	 structuring	 of	 the	 project;	 this,	 in	 turn,	 would	 guarantee	 funding	 from	 several	
government	programs.	 Some	Asociación’s	members	 hoped	 that	 the	 skills,	 knowledge,	 and	
links	 of	 JLB’S	 firm	with	 officials	 and	 program	 orchestrators	would	 be	 beneficial	 to	 get	 the	
project	money	for	the	Asociación;	others	doubted	the	firm’s	strategy.		
As	the	project	progressed,	the	strategies	used	by	JLB‘s	firm	became	visible,	especially	
their	 interest	 in	 project	 money.	 Asociación	members	 were	 ambiguous:	 the	 management	
committee	 proposed	 that	 JLB’s	 firm	 continue	 with	 the	 management	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
Asociación,	while	other	partners	began	 to	doubt	 the	effectiveness	of	 JLB‘s	 services.	At	 the	
same	 time,	 actions	 of	 the	 eight	 SPRs	 that	were	 not	 united	 in	 the	Asociación	 appeared	 to	












search	 for	 alternative	 service	 providers.	 Identifying	 with	 their	 own	 greenhouse	 project	
























the	 assembly	 had	 taken	 by	 starting	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	 background	 of	 JLB's	 firm	 in	





















partner)	often	showed	off	 in	 front	of	Lupita	Sánchez,	who	was	his	neighbour	 in	La	Piedad,	
Michoacán,	bragging	about	the	cars	and	the	luxury	homes	he	had	as	a	result	of	working	with	
greenhouses	in	Michoacán	(Municipality	of	Tanhuato,	03/12/03).	













JLB’s	 interference.	 Now	 the	 partners	 sought	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Rural	 Government	 Bank	
(Financiera	Rural),	which	did	not	ask	for	a	 liquid	guarantee;	 in	addition	to	this,	 they	would	






stated	 that	 they	 could	 work	 with	 FIRA	 projects.	 In	 Ramón’s	 opinion,	 ACEA	 (Agricultural	
Extension	 and	 Construction	 Consultants)	 offered	 the	 best	 price/quality	 balance.	 ACEA	 is	 a	
















a	 specialist	 in	 irrigation	 systems.	Nacho	explained	 that	 the	Atacheo	groups	were	 linked	 to	
PYMEXPORTA,	 a	 decentralized	 office,	 subsidized	 by	 the	 federal,	 state	 and	 municipal	
governments.	 PYMEXPORTA	 offered	 advice	 to	 groups	 for	 consolidating	 their	
commercialization	 plans	 through	 contact	with	Daniel	Díaz	 Barriga.	 These	 types	 of	 services	
were	mainly	offered	in	Zamora	for	agricultural	and	vegetable	production.	We	then	heard	him	
speak	 about	 “Soulfresh”	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 which	 supervised	 vegetable	 crops,	 and	 the	
government	support	provided	prior	to	the	sale	of	the	product	by	means	of	working	capital.	
The	 National	 Institute	 of	 Forestry,	 Agriculture	 and	 Livestock	 (INIFAP)	 and	 FIRA	 had	

























about	 what	 we	 had	 learned	 in	 Tanhuato	 and	 Atacheo,	 and	 he	 said	 that	 it	 confirmed	 his	
suspicions	about	the	project	and	that	now	we	had	reasons	to	refute	JLB’S	firm	and	propose	
alternatives.	Gonzalo	 had	measured	 the	 political	 cost	 of	 doing	 so.	 Lino	 proposed	 that	 the	
greenhouses	would	be	built	with	ACEA	while	JLB	would	manage	the	federal	resources.	Gonzalo	
looked	 at	 him	 and	 said,	 "You	 did	 not	 understand	 anything.	 The	 municipal	 president	 of	
Tanhuato	 has	 completely	 cut	 JLB	 out	 by	 ignoring	 him	 and	 they	went	 their	 separate	ways	
(SEPLADE,	03/12/03)”.	It	seems	that	Lino	had	its	own	perspective	regarding	JLB’s	interference,	
and	had	decided	to	be	on	his	side,	despite	the	arguments	obtained	that	day.	This	evidenced	














To	 verify	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 greenhouses	 visited	 were	
presented.	At	 the	end	of	 an	Asociación	meeting	 in	 Zacapu,	Rafa	 Lp	 (a	 SEPLADE	 technician)	
introduced	 me	 to	 his	 wife	 Margarita,	 representative	 of	 the	 group	 Citizen	 Women’s	
Movement.72	Her	sister,	Violeta,	and	Reina,	from	the	Naranja	community,	accompanied	her.	
They	formed	the	executive	board	for	a	group	of	20	women,	who	sporadically	attended	the	
Asociación's	meetings.	 This	 SPR	wanted	 to	do	a	 tour	of	 the	Atacheo	greenhouses,	 and	we	
agreed	to	go	the	following	Saturday	morning	(on	January	4,	2004).	We	agreed	with	Polo	(SPR	
Laredo)	that	we	could	take	his	truck	to	Zamora,	and	we	picked	up	Rafa	Lp73	and	the	women's	














greenhouses	 had	 been	 notorious.	 To	 this	 regard,	 Rafa	 Lp'	 father,	 who	 had	 a	 small	 family	
business	 dedicated	 to	 processing	 plastic,	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 strengthening	 the	
creation	of	Mexican	products	 to	 create	 jobs,	 economic	 impact	 and	 confidence	 in	our	own	










more	 people	 from	 Coeneo	 to	 see	 the	 Atacheo	 greenhouses	 and,	 at	 the	 end,	 praised	 the	
participation	of	the	women’s	group	from	Zacapu.	
Seeing	 a	 real	 greenhouse	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 SPRs’	 members.	 Interaction	 with	 the	
greenhouse,	the	living	entities	and	technology	changed	the	perspective	of	those	involved	and	
helped	 to	 strengthen	 the	 project,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 Later	 on,	 we	would	 see	 the	
learning	experience	led	to	rearrangements	to	adapt	to	this	new	reality	learning.	It	was	in	this	
way	that	the	collective	was	continuously	re-formed,	 in	each	 instance	needing	to	rearrange	






















Meanwhile,	 Polo	 sought	 to	 consolidate	his	 networks	promoting	 technological	 alternatives,	
and	El	Campeón	sought	to	consolidate	real	and	immediate	alternatives	for	women	of	limited	
resources	 in	Coeneo.	Each	of	them	talked	to	me	separately.	The	three	actors	agreed	that	 I	
should	 be	 the	 link	 between	 the	 group	 of	 women	 from	 Zacapu	 and	 Coeneo	 and	 Nacho	
(greenhouse	administrator	in	Atacheo).	I	confirmed	the	visiting	dates	with	Nacho,	and	a	day	



































































































Over	 the	 following	 days,	 different	 groups	 from	 the	 Asociación	 continued	 to	 visit	 the	
greenhouses	 in	 Atacheo	 where	 they	 could	 see	 how	 the	 people	 in	 charge	 carried	 out	 the	
pruning	using	3-meter	stepladders,	showing	expertise	when	moving	around	at	 that	height,	
and	 carrying	 out	 the	 trellising,	managing	 the	 plant.77	 Several	women	were	 harvesting	 the	
tomatoes.	In	Nacho's	assessment,	they	had	better	results	when	women	did	this,	as	they	were	
more	 careful	when	harvesting	 and	packaging.	 Each	plant	 at	 the	 time	had	 four	bunches	of	











adapted	 by	 Nacho,	 whose	 company	 supplied	 irrigation	 to	 a	 large	 part	 of	 Zamora,	 with	 a	
different	method	of	production,	such	as	macro-tunnels,	shade	mesh	and	open-air.	The	units	
were	five	meters	high	and	had	been	adapted	for	the	area	by	the	supplier	ACEA.	The	overhead	
ventilation	 was	 reinforced	 with	 independent	 vents	 handled	 manually,	 like	 front	 and	 side	
curtains.	The	aisle	was	covered	with	gravel	from	the	region	(tezontle,	a	type	of	red	volcanic	





















send	 them	 to	 the	 packaging	 area.	 Some	members	 of	 the	Asociación	 wondered:	 How	 is	 it	
possible	 for	 the	 Atacheo	 group	 to	 do	 this	 manually	 in	 such	 a	 small	 space,	 covered	 with	
tarpaulin?	




















did	 not	 have	 to	 use	 helmets	 or	 hairnets,	 nor	 had	 we	 been	 told	 not	 to	 touch	 the	 plants.	
According	 to	 the	 partners,	 these	 protective	 measures	 for	 food	 safety	 were	 not	 being	
implemented	in	Atacheo.	
As	for	greenhouse	interaction	with	the	external	environment,	it	was	assumed	that	the	












making	 it	possible	to	have	areas	 in	different	production	stages,	 in	accordance	with	market	
planning.	 It	 could	 also	 have	 different	 varieties	 of	 tomatoes	 or	 other	 plants.	 The	 ability	 to	
manage	a	greenhouse	implied	recognition	of	small	imperfections	of	the	crop,	which	in	turn	
depended	 on	 the	 greenhouse’s	 own	 environment.	 Humans	 should	 then	 help	 to	make	 the	




close	 the	 curtains	 to	 the	 level	 the	 crops	 required?	 The	 operator	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 the	
external	and	internal	conditions	and	factors	such	as	external	and	internal	temperature,	and	
find	 out,	 via	 complicated	 computer	 algorithms,	 the	 correlation	 of	 trends	 and	 impacts	 of	
handling.	We	had	talked	about	implementing	control	mechanisms	to	transfer	information	to	







aim	was	 to	 reach	 an	 optimal	 conditions	 for	 each	 phenological	 phase	 of	 the	 crop,	 relative	
humidity	outside	and	inside	of	each	area	of	the	greenhouse	and,	of	course,	the	recovery	of	
nutrients	(Armando’s	concern)	that	should	be	recycled	into	the	system	after	chemical	analysis.	

















it	 is	 exposed	 from	 birth	 make	 it	 unique.	 In	 seedling	 greenhouses,	 they	 remain	 heaped,	
increasing	the	competition	between	them.	When	some	seedlings	show	a	nutritional	deficiency	
















Apart	 from	the	productive	phase	there	are	other	 factors	 related	to	 the	greenhouse	




foreseen	 for	 the	 project.	 In	 Atacheo	 consultants,	 such	 as	 Pymexporta,	 did	 just	 this.	 The	
integrating	company,	the	abstract	entity	not	present	in	the	initial	phase	of	the	project,	would	








should	 be	 lower	 than	 the	 number	 proposed	 by	 JLB,	 in	 order	 to	 have	 fewer	 specialized	
technicians	 and	provide	niche	 conditions	 for	 those	who	had	 the	 knowledge,	making	 them	
more	difficult	to	replace.	For	this	task,	Chema	already	had	in	mind	her	son-in-law,	Eliseo,	and	
Mr.	 Abelardo	 (from	 Purépechas)	 thought	 about	 his	 son.	 For	 the	 technical	 training,	 I	 was	
proposed	as	a	supervisor,	while	Cristi	and	Ampa	would	perform	as	administrators,	referring	































for	 introducing	new	elements	 from	a	 foreign	 repertoire	 (either	 through	 translation	or	
direct	adoption),	yet	they	"accept",	so	to	speak,	those	products	because	they	recognize	











located	 in	 Morelia.	 The	 partners	 that	 went	 there	 agreed	 that	 the	 facilities	 were	 mostly	
abandoned	and	neglected.	FIRA	boasted	to	have	the	latest	technology,	but	after	reviewing	in	
detail,	the	partners	admitted	that	national	greenhouses,	in	general,	were	not	at	the	level	of	




After	 the	members	 saw	some	models	of	greenhouses,	 the	Asociación	was	 ready	 to	
receive	proposals	and	options	by	their	respective	suppliers.	In	the	offices	of	SEPLADE	in	Zacapu,	
greenhouse	companies	 such	as	 the	French	company	Richel,	ALQUER	 (from	Almería,	 Spain),	
some	from	the	United	States	and	ACEA	from	Mexico	itself,	presented	their	plans.	The	Banco	







With	that	kind	of	comment,	 it	seemed	that	 JLB	had	adapted	to	the	dynamics	 in	the	
Asociación,	and	sought	to	minimize	the	presence	of	ACEA	and	Mexican	technicians	–	yet	still	
he	conditioned	marketing	to	his	proposal.	JLB	claimed	he	would	not	buy	tomatoes	that	did	not	
meet	 the	 quality	 necessary	 to	 comply	with	 the	market;	 also,	 he	 claimed	 copyright	 of	 the	






the	 model	 elsewhere.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 suppliers	 was	 Mr.	 Alonso	 (Almería,	 Spain),	
representative	 and	manager	 of	 the	 company	 ALQUER.	 Invited	 by	 JLB,	 the	manager	 visited	
Zacapu	without	knowing	the	project.	He	visited	just	to	gather	information,	but	the	partners	
were	upset	that	Mr.	Alonso	did	not	resolve	specific	doubts.	JLB	suggested	Lino	and	Heredia	to	





The	 owner	 of	 ACEA	 (Toño)	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 husband	 of	 Thalia,	 one	 of	my	 co-
workers	at	the	Colegio	de	Postgraduados.79	Toño	had	been	involved	for	15	years	in	adapting	
greenhouse	technology	to	the	national	needs.	Before	the	meeting	I	had	the	opportunity	to	




however,	 he	 warned	 me	 that	 it	 concerned	 a	 greenhouse	 of	 higher	 cost	 than	 those	 of	
Atacheo.80	Malla	(Los	Pinos)	said	that	Toño	inspired	her	confidence,	while	Ampa,	a	member	







become	 responsible	 for	 training	 for	 greenhouse	 production.	 Toño	 considered	 it	 was	
appropriate	 to	 take	 the	minutes	 of	 the	 last	 and	 reconsider	 Valadez’s	 participation.	While	
heating	and	 irrigation	were	proposed	by	Nacho	 in	 collaboration	with	ACEA,	 the	Asociación	
would	 recognize	Nacho’s	management	 capacity,	 and	 despite	 collaborating	with	 ACEA	 they	
would	assign	him	his	own	negotiating	area.	This	time,	Nacho	attended	with	a	group	of	partners	














with	 ULMA	 because	 of	 training	 opportunities	 in	 Spain.81	 Ampa	 spoke	 with	 Espinoza	 (SPR	
Marijo)	and	also	convinced	him	to	vote	for	ACEA.	
When	 the	 vote	 took	 place,	 Heredia	 and	 JLB	 proposed	 that	 the	 assembly	would	 be	
entitled	to	vote	only	for	the	20	SPRs	who	had	SEDAGRO	funding.	These	actions	were	intended	
to	block	the	eight	SPRs	that	had	been	included	after	the	project.	Heredia	stated:	"The	Alianza	
groups	 [the	remaining	eight]	are	 in	another	 financing	scheme	and	they	should	respect	 the	
project	as	it	is	set	for	the	Asociación	[the	20	groups]"	(SEPLADE,	12/03/04).	This	made	clear	
that.	for	the	managing	committee	and	JLB	at	least,	the	Asociación	was	composed	of	20	SPRs,	
although	 in	 the	 formation	 there	 were	 28	 SPRs	 specified,	 all	 with	 the	 same	 rights	 and	
obligations	 (see	 Chapter	 3).	 The	 group	 of	 Margarita	 (Citizen	Women)	 did	 not	 attend	 the	
meeting;	Rafa	Lp'	father	(SPR	Bajo	Invernadero),	arrived	in	the	end,	like	Pancho	(SPR	Comanja).	
Those	who	 supported	ULMA	highlighted	 the	nationality	of	 the	builder,	 arguing	 that	














Saúl	 accepted	 the	 technological	 dependence	 on	 Spain	 in	 matters	 related	 to	 the	
production	of	greenhouses	and	how	we	should	work	with	the	"originals".	Although	he	and	his	
nephews	would	go	with	JLB's	project,	they	said	that	if	it	was	a	guideline	to	support	the	Mexican	
company	ACEA,	 they	would	do	 it	 in	 the	end,	because	 there	would	not	be	more	options.	 If	
necessary	he	could	negotiate	with	Silvano	Aureoles	of	SEDAGRO.	Ampa	no	longer	mentioned	
the	option	of	the	US	company	because	greenhouses	with	plastic	shade	mesh	did	not	fit	well	
























the	 option	 entailed	 immediate	 construction	 (like	 I	 had	 discussed	 with	 Gonzalo),	 reusing	
















Asociación	 a	 formal	 proposal	 of	 the	 modules	 with	 the	 technical	 and	 engineering	 design	
completed	by	ACEA.	
Thus,	most	 of	 the	 partners	 of	 the	 Asociación	 chose	 to	 build	 the	 "real"	 greenhouse	






project.	 The	Asociación	 had	been	 formed	as	manager,	 and	now	was	 involved	 in	managing	
financial	resources	and	emerging	from	as	a	network	of	capabilities	and	resources	able	to	enrol	











The	 Asociación's	 managing	 committee	 sought	 to	 take	 control	 of	 the	 project	
negotiations.	However,	the	dynamics	proposed	by	the	SPRs	linked	to	ACEA	prevailed	and	gave	
a	new	direction	to	the	organization:	17	SPRs	were	in	support	of	the	project’s	option	for	real	











as	 an	 alternative	 livelihood,	 the	 expectation	 of	 an	 improved	 income,	 and	 a	 development	
opportunity.	An	adviser	(like	JLB)	used	his	cultural	repertoire	(Even-Zohar,	2005)	as	a	resource	
to	 position	 himself	 as	 the	 undisputed	 choice.	 This	 strategy	 caused	 technological	 and	





their	 image	 of	 a	 greenhouse,	 adapt	 it	 to	 real-life	 conditions,	 and	 accept	 the	 challenge	 of	
transforming	 the	 image	 of	 an	 “ideal”	 greenhouse	 to	 real,	 local	 circumstances.	 Through	
	82	
subsequent	 visits	 to	 greenhouse	 in	 other	 locations,	 new	 scenarios	 of	 acquisition	 and	
reinterpretation	of	knowledge	became	possible.	After	they	had	already	identified	themselves	




























restructuring	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 This	 phase	 is	 known	 as	 the	 mobilization	 phase	 of	 the	
Asociación,	 led	 by	 the	 groups	 that	 chose	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses	 with	 ACEA.	 The	 USPR	
Productos	Inocuos	continued	with	JLB’s	firm.	This	chapter	zooms	in	on	that	division,	and	the	
organizational	 processes	 concerning	 the	 Asociación’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 government	
agencies	FIRCO,	FOMICH,	FIRA	and	SEDAGRO,	as	well	as	the	issue	of	the	distribution	of	project	











and	 SEDAGRO	 had	 requested	 references	 of	 the	 ULMA	 company,	 and	 the	 articles	 of	




USD	 8,400	 for	 credit	 management	 with	 a	 European	 bank,	 as	 specified	 in	 the	 project.	
Financially,	 the	 project	 included	 a	 liquid	 guarantee	 of	 10%	 (equivalent	 to	 USD	 420,000)	
covering	both	the	working	capital	and	the	contribution	in	kind	that	the	partners	would	make.	
The	 FOMICH	 representative	 clarified	 that,	 in	 the	event	of	 requesting	 credit	 from	European	
banks,	the	Banco	de	México	would	not	provide	liquid	guarantee.	This	appeared	to	be	JLB’s	first	










the	 resources	 in	 the	 trust.	 Finally,	he	would	manage	 the	 commercialization	 in	order	 to	be	
involved	in	the	trading	of	the	tomatoes.	In	this	way,	the	SPRs	would	be	the	target	for	obtaining	
government	resources	from	the	financial	institutions	as	well	as	from	the	stakeholders.	
In	 clear	 disagreement	 with	 the	 proposal	 from	 JLB’S	 firm,	 René	 mentioned	 the	
documents	showing	the	firm	as	guarantor,	in	particular	the	letter	of	commitment	to	work	with	












engage	 in	 the	 conversation.	 The	 officials	 explained	 that	 JLB’s	 firm	 frequently	 showed	
intolerance	in	meetings	with	them,	and	urged	to	put	alleged	“verbal”	commitments	made	with	
government	officials	on	paper.	
The	 alleged	participation	 of	 FOMICH	 (30%	 liquid	 guarantee)	 in	 the	 project	was	 also	
discussed.	René	explained	that	the	rules	of	FOMICH	considered	a	maximum	liquid	guarantee	
of	10%,	in	coordination	with	other	institutions	such	as	FIRA	and	other	banks;	this	would	have	
to	 be	 contributed	once	 the	 credit	 line	was	 authorized,	 and	 served	 as	 backup	 for	 the	 loan	


















Nájera,	 the	 FOMICH	 representative.	 The	 Asociación	 requested	 a	 support	 of	 10%	 for	 liquid	




results.	 In	 the	Asociación	 there	 existed	were	 two	 positions:	 the	 first	 was	 to	 let	 JLB’s	 firm	
continue	with	the	negotiations	and	be	assisted	by	the	Asociación’s	managing	committee	when	
required.	Under	 this	proposal,	 the	Asociación	 should	transfer	control	of	 the	shares	 to	 JLB’S	
firm.	The	second	position	 implied	 that	 the	Asociación	would	 initiate	 the	negotiations.	Two	
partners	(SPRs	La	Mesa	and	Sabor	del	Campo)	who	sympathized	with	JLB	would	ask	SEPLADE	
to	 release	 the	 resources,	 saying	 that	 they	would	go	with	 the	option	offered	by	 JBL’s	 firm.	
Gonzalo	answered	that	the	requirements	concerning	the	completion	of	the	financial	resources	
proposed	in	the	project	had	to	be	met	and	submitted	to	SUPLADER.	Pancho	(SPR	Comanja)	and	
Norberto	 presented	 their	 point	 of	 view,	 but	 they	 seemed	 disconnected	 from	 the	 project.	
Heredia	perceived	this	and	accused	them	of	slowing	down	the	meeting.	


















travelled	 in	 Chema’s	 truck,	 and	 Jesús	 accompanied	 us.	 Jesús	 had	 worked	 with	 Chema	 in	
Celanese85	and	the	latter	had	encouraged	Jesús	to	continue	studying	industrial	engineering.	
																																																						














seemed	 like	 this	 type	 of	 talk	 was	 generic	 and	 prepared	 for	 visitors	 without	 any	 specific	
requests.	When	we	asked	him	about	 the	Asociación's	 case	and	how	 to	 land	 the	 resources	
concretely,	he	 said	 that	FIRA	would	be	 interested	 in	 the	Asociación's	project	once	we	had	
obtained	the	bank’s	credit	line	authorized	for	this	purpose.	He	referred	to	PROGOMICH86	and	
































would	make	an	appointment	with	 the	directive	board	of	 PROGOMICH.	He	 suggested	not	 to	





























participate	 in	 the	project.	FIRCO,	Rafa	continued,	stated	that	 this	conversation	had	already	
taken	place	with	Heredia	as	representative	of	the	Asociación.	However,	up	until	now	Heredia	





















developed	 by	 the	 JLB	 firm	with	 FIRCO,	 and	 the	 agreed	 commitments.	 Domingo	 Ruvalcaba	
intervened	in	the	assembly	and	immediately	contradicted	JLB.	He	affirmed	that	so	far	there	
had	not	been	any	commitments	between	FIRCO	and	the	Asociación.	JLB	defended	himself	by	
presenting	 old	 documents	 from	 FOMICH	 and	 commitment	 letters	 from	 SEDAGRO	 and	
SUPLADER.	Domingo	Ruvalcaba	clarified	that	FIRCO	should	be	in	contact	with	the	producers,	
then	he	made	a	proposal	of	how	we	could	access	10%	of	the	resources	to	obtain	the	liquid	
















meeting,	 in	virtue	of	 the	decision	 that	he	would	not	participate	 in	 it,	and	 that	 it	would	be	
presented	 only	 afterwards	 to	 the	 SPRs	 that	 collaborated	 with	 his	 firm.	 Then	 he	 said,	
surprisingly:	“I	accept	that	in	business	sometimes	you	win	and	sometimes	you	lose”.	
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the	 same	 objectives	 as	 the	 Asociación.	 April	 30,	 2004	 was	 set	 as	 the	 deadline	 for	 the	
permission	 of	 the	 president	 and	 secretary	 to	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 continue	 in	 their	
positions	within	the	Asociación	or	to	quit	permanently.	In	this	assembly,	the	pending	SPRs:	
Deyna	 (Chema),	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 La	 Jabonera,	 and	 Movimiento	 Ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres	









SPRs	making	up	Productos	 Inocuos	were	 Sabor	del	 Campo	 (Jaime),	 Purépechas	 (Abelardo),	
Presa	Azteca	(Saúl),	Jiménez	(Lino),	La	Mesa	(Avelino),	Provech	(Rodolfo),	Los	Sauces	(Manuel	






















onwards	 they	no	 longer	participated	 in	 the	Asociación.	 The	 first	 formal	division	originated	
from	the	disagreements	with	the	proposal	of	JLB’s	firm,	when	choosing	another	provider.	The	










On	 April	 30,	 2004,	 the	 Asociación	 reached	 the	 deadline	 for	 Heredia	 and	 Lino	 as	
President	and	Secretary,	respectively,	to	decide	if	they	wanted	to	continue	in	the	Asociación’s	
management	committee.	Inside	the	Asociación	the	legal	actions	were	discussed	that	would	







Asociación,	 Gonzalo	 proposed	 to	 meet	 on	 April	 27,	 2004	 in	 Santa	 Gertrudis	 with	 Saúl,	 a	
member	 of	 SPR	 Azteca	 (part	 of	 Productos	 Inocuos),	 since	 according	 to	 Gonzalo	 he	 had	
experience	and	vision.	That	day,	Saúl	received	Gonzalo	and	me	in	his	house,	and	he	invited	us	
for	dinner.	At	75	Don	Saúl,	as	he	was	called,	was	considered	one	of	the	regional	leaders.	At	






form	 a	 group.	 That	 was	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Hungarians	 that	 suggested	 technological	
packages,	 in	 which	 using	 fertilizer	 with	 optimal	 doses	 increased	 the	 production.	
Nevertheless,	organization	was	not	reached	and	the	group	divided.	The	government	bets	
on	the	lack	of	unity;	it	is	like	asking	for	a	residence	permit	at	the	United	States	Embassy:	



















had	been	made,	clarifying	that	 JLB’S	 firm	was	clearly	co-responsible	 for	this.	As	Saúl	 rightly	
observed:	 the	majority	 of	 the	members	must	 have	 taken	 the	 decision	 of	 not	 dividing	 the	
Asociación	 at	 that	 time.	 The	 solution	 for	 the	 project	 would	 lie	 in	 cohesion	 and	 common	
interests,	even	if	the	strategies	that	each	of	the	USPRs	followed	enhanced	the	negotiations,	
so	now	it	was	time	to	be	reunified	again.	




of	 the	members	 and	 negotiate	 the	 funds	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses.	 The	 intention	was	 to	
release	the	resources	of	both	USPRs	into	a	joint	venture.	
A	 few	days	after	approaching	 the	counterpart	 (Productos	 Inocuos),	 and	despite	 the	
previous	negotiations	with	Saúl,	some	of	the	Asociación’s	members	still	considered	the	option	
of	 a	 legal	 rupture	 with	 Productos	 Inocuos	 on	 grounds	 that,	 according	 to	 the	Asociación´s	
regulations,	the	SPRs	that	were	not	collaborating	could	legally	claim	the	resources	given	to	
the	Asociación.	For	this	purpose,	a	committee	was	designated	to	analyse,	judge,	and	propose	

















their	 participation	 in	 Productos	 Inocuos.	 With	 project	 consolidation	 in	 sight,	 this	 was	 the	
chance	of	re-joining	both	USPRs.	When	the	committee	stated	its	position,	it	considered	that	
negotiations	had	been	conducted	by	the	former	representatives	of	the	Asociación,	with	the	
















At	 that	 moment,	 a	 harsh	 discussion	 started	 that	 went	 to	 the	 point	 of	 discussing	 the	





Gonzalo	 and	 the	 Asociación’s	 management	 committee	 to	 carry	 out	 “irregular	 actions”.	
Gonzalo	proposed	to	reduce	the	conflicts	until	the	resources	arrived,	and	then	to	allow	each	
USPR	 to	 go	 forward	 with	 their	 own	 project.	 Ampa	 criticized	 the	mediators’	 role	 of	 some	
members	of	the	Asociación	and	suggested	to	expel	them	as	a	group,	including	Abelardo	for	
being	“too	loose-minded”.		
It	was	decided	by	majority	of	votes	 to	expel	all	 SPRs	 that	participated	 in	Productos	
Inocuos	 from	the	Asociación.	 It	was	also	decided	 to	 ratify	 the	management	committee	 for	
three	years.	Once	the	corresponding	assembly’s	certificate	was	formally	registered	in	front	of	
Ernestina,	 the	Notary,	 the	 current	management	 committee	 formed	 by	myself	 (president),	
Esperanza	 (secretary),	 and	Mare	 (treasurer)	 was	 formalized.	 From	 the	 bank’s	 standpoint,	









to	 manage	 some	 money	 because	 at	 that	 moment	 the	 conflict	 will	 start”.	 Financial	





contribute	with	financial	 resources	to	the	project	 implied	a	 formal	commitment	that	could	
cause	internal	conflict	within	and	among	the	SPRs.	
At	 some	 point,	 it	 seemed	 that	 the	 formal	 ejection	 of	 some	 of	 the	 SPRs	 from	 the	










each	 SPR,	 the	 differences	 in	 planning,	management,	 investment	 and	 authorization	 of	 the	
resources	caused	uncertainty.				
From	my	point	of	view,	 the	Asociación’s	 split	had	 its	origin	 in	 the	different	ways	of	
perceiving	 the	 project.	 Some	 SPRs	 linked	 with	 JLB	 relied	 on	 his	 network,	 resources	 and	








projected	 financial	 costs	 of	more	 than	 USD	 200,000,	 while	 ACEA’s	 greenhouse	 costs	 were	
quoted	 to	 be	 significantly	 less.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 SEDAGRO	 had	 already	 authorized	 USD	
200,000	for	the	Asociación,	so	now	Products	Inocuos	claimed	part	of	that	money	for	its	SPRs.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	 they	 claimed	USD	 100,000	 –	which	 corresponded	 to	 the	 10	 SPRs	 now	with	
Productos	Inocuos.	They	anticipated	that	SEDAGRO’s	resources	could	have	been	delivered	to	
the	Asociación	“by	mistake";	in	this	event	the	Asociación	would	have	to	share	the	money	with	
them,	 assuring	 that	 SEDAGRO	would	 label	 the	 amount	 for	 each	 SPR.	 The	members	 of	 the	

















To	 speed	 up	 the	 process,	 the	 Asociación	 contacted	 Javier	 Torres,	 director	 of	
Hortofruticultura	of	SEDAGRO	in	order	to	negotiate	with	him	the	letter	of	commitment	that	
SEDAGRO	 would	 have	 to	 sign	 with	 the	 Asociación,	 request	 the	 speeding	 up	 of	 Alianza’s	
process,94	and	a	clarification	of	the	relation	of	JLB’S	firm	with	the	Asociación.	
In	the	past,	another	letter	had	been	sent	to	Silvano	Aureoles,	requesting	to	speed	up	




as	 the	 link	between	SEDAGRO	and	SUPLADER,	and	who	was	 in	charge	of	writing	 the	project	
reports	of	the	Asociación’s	progress.	It	appeared	that	there	were	inconsistencies	between	the	
versions	of	 the	 facts	 and	 the	 reports,	 but	 also	with	 the	director’s	 instructions	which	were	
transmitted	to	the	Asociación.	Salvador	informed	us	that	SUPLADER	had	supported	five	SPRs	
on	 behalf	 of	 Alianza	 and	 that	 we	 had	 requested	 the	 support	 of	 nine	 SPRs	 as	 part	 of	 a	
compromise	with	SEDAGRO.	He	also	mentioned	the	alleged	split	up	of	the	Asociación,	resulting	
in	another	USPR	formed	by	the	11	SPRs	that	still	belonged	to	the	Asociación,	and	represented	
by	 the	 previous	 president	 and	 secretary	 of	 the	Asociación.	 Now	 the	 new	USPR	 (Productos	
Inocuos)	 requested	 the	 resources	 from	SEDAGRO	 for	 their	own	SPRs.	We	explained	 to	 Juan	
Portillo	that	the	information	submitted	to	him	was	incorrect,	and	that	there	was	no	formal	







before	 extending	 the	 letter	 of	 commitment	 concerning	 the	 resources	 of	 SEDAGRO.	 It	 was	















(Juan	 Portillo,	 SEDAGRO,	 13/05/04).	 Torres	 Téllez	 considered	 the	 possibility	 that	 financial	
support	would	be	granted	through	Alianza,	and	that	this	was	supported	by	resources	from	the	
agriculture	subprogram.	This	involved	speeding	up	the	procedures	and	documents	required	












in	 Tangancícuaro,	 namely	 the	 SPRs	 of	 La	 Jabonera	 and	 Purépero	 –	 for	 a	 total	 of	 twelve	
requests.	In	the	previous	phase,	La	Jabonera	had	paid	management	costs	to	JLB’s	firm;	yet,	he	
had	 not	 provided	 the	 corresponding	 documents	 to	 Tangancicuato’s	 CADER.	 The	 SPR	
Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	(Margarita)	had	not	submitted	their	file	to	CADER	since	
they	had	no	interest	in	the	greenhouse	project.	They	were	interested	in	mushroom	production	
and	prefered	 to	 remain	 an	 independent	 SPR.	However,	Rafa	 Lp,	 an	official	 of	 the	 SEPLADE	
Zacapu	and	husband	of	Margarita,	had	invited	and	included	them	in	the	Asociación’s	project.	
For	 the	2004	promotion	the	relationship	with	 the	CADER	 in	Zacapu	was	good.	Cristi	
(Biotecnológicos)	talked	to	Donaciano,	responsible	for	processing	CADER’s	requests	of	Alianza,	
and	 he	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 new	 applications	 for	 ten	 SPRs.	 Donaciano	 pledged	 to	 support	
whenever	necessary.	Based	on	previous	experience,	 the	Asociación	 improved	 the	 logistics,	
validating	partners’	data	and	quickly	completing	the	application.	Also,	the	documents	of	the	
SPRs	Purépero	and	La	Jabonera	were	gathered	and	submitted	to	the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	
Cristi,	 responsible	 for	 completing	 the	 records	 of	 Alianza,	 showed	 no	 significant	
progress.	 Errors	 when	 filling	 out	 applications	 were	 committed,	 and	 although	 occasionally	
some	partners	despaired	due	to	the	load	of	paperwork,	they	were	still	seriously	following	the	
instructions	 that	 Cristi	 gave	 them.	 Cristi	 deftly	 managed	 to	 involve	 members	 of	 other	
committees,	 particularly	 women,	 so	 they	 ended	 up	 supporting	 Cristi	 in	 her	 work.	 It	 was	










Purépero	and	La	 Jabonera	SPRs	did	 it	 in	 the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	Having	 learned	 from	
previous	 negotiations	with	 CADER,	 the	Asociación	 easily	 submitted	 the	 application	 files	 to	
CADER	by	a	committee	headed	by	Cristi	and	Lupita	(Secretary	of	the	Asociación)	who,	this	time	
closely	working	 together,	 avoided	mistakes	 in	 capturing	 and	 processing	 information	while	
using	the	computer	system	of	Alianza.	 In	this	second	application	to	CADER,	the	partners	no	
longer	 went	 there	 but	 signed	 the	 required	 documents	 at	 the	 Asociación,	 which	 in	 turn	
submitted	them	directly.	At	one	point,	CADER	even	came	to	seek	the	support	of	the	Asociación	











and	 Humberto	 (a	 CADER	 official)	 told	 us	 to	 hand	 over	 the	 documents,	 and	 suggested	 to	
Roberto	that	the	application	had	to	be	submitted	to	PAPIR	 -	arguing	that	there	were	more	
resources	 in	 CADER’s	 program.	 Apparently,	 in	 Tlazazalca	 the	 applications	 had	 not	 been	
submitted	to	PAPIR.		














see	her	with	a	copy	of	Tlazazalca’s	deed,	 together	with	a	copy	of	 the	 land	 title	where	 the	
greenhouse	was	to	be	established.	In	that	document,	the	measurements	and	boundaries	were	





















CADER,	 I	better	give	a	tip	 to	 its	personnel.	 I	do	not	know	how	to	do	 it."	 (Alvaro,	29/06/04,	
SEPLADE).	This	was	evidence	that	there	was	room	for	maneuverer	with	CADER	officials,	and	
that	 it	 was	 preferable	 to	 maintain	 a	 good	 relationship	 with	 them,	 which	 simplified	 the	
necessary	steps	-	as	we	had	already	experienced	in	the	CADER	of	Zacapu.	















(a	 nephew	 of	 Heredia)	 and	 Jiménez	 to	 hold	 this	 meeting	 and	 include	 the	 draft	 of	 the	
greenhouses’	 project	 in	 the	 agenda.	 The	 meeting	 was	 attended	 by	 Lino	 (Jiménez),	 Saúl	
(Azteca),	and	the	municipal	presidents	of	Tlazazalca,	Jiménez	and	Coeneo	(our	host).	There	



















dealings	 (PRODESCA).	 Carlos	 implied	 that	he	 could	 sue	 the	 SPR	 for	not	 complying	with	 the	
provisions	 of	 the	 project.	 During	 the	meeting,	 the	 support	 of	 Salvador	 (SEDAGRO’s	 link	 in	
SUPLADER)	to	JLB’S	firm	was	evident.	Salvador	recommended	negotiating	the	debt	with	JLB’S	












left	 happy	 after	 the	 meeting:	 28	 SPR	 had	 been	 considered	 for	 funding	 by	 SUPLADER.	 An	
important	step	in	the	project	had	been	taken.		






who	 represented	 the	 government.	 	 This	 committee	met	with	 two	 representatives	 of	 each	






the	 available	 resources	 from	 SUPLADER,	 SEDAGRO	 and	 Alianza.	 However,	 other	 members	


































the	 financial	 requirements	 for	 ACEA’S	 greenhouses.	 Also,	 the	 costs	 from	 another	 three	
companies	 were	 included,	 as	 well	 as	 commitment	 letters	 for	 input	 supply	 and	
commercialization,	and	water	permits	from	CONAGUA.	For	this	purpose,	work	meetings	were	
held	with	Rogelio	(FIRCO).	Project	validation	of	the	17	SPRs	in	front	of	FIRCO	was	conducted	in	
stages;	 the	Asociación’s	 partners	 provided	 the	 necessary	 documentation	 to	 rearrange	 the	
project,	 while	 the	 management	 committee	 made	 the	 adjustments	 according	 to	 FIRCO’S	
regulations.	 The	 workload	 was	 exhausting.	 Due	 to	 the	 efforts	 made	 with	 Alianza,	 Irma’s	










Each	 time	 the	 technician	 reviewed	 Irma’s	 record,	 he	 pointed	 to	 new	 adjustments.	 For	
example,	in	Irma’s	SPR	four	partners	were	included	that	were	not	accredited	as	agricultural	
and	livestock	producers.	Irma	presented	letters	written	by	the	municipal	authority	stating	the	
























They	 advise	 people	 about	 the	 projects,	 and	 they	 also	 offer	 to	 negotiate	 to	 get	 the	






proceed	 with	 the	 financial	 proposals.	 Abaco,	 like	 JLB,	 was	 hunting	 for	 projects	 related	 to	






work	 plan,	which	 included	 greenhouse	 quotations,	 authorized	 letters	 by	Alianza	 to	 ACEA’S	
providers.	The	work	plan	included	training	and	supplies	included.	Vicente	(ACEA)	said:	
 
I	understand	that	Nacho	wants	to	be	 included	 in	the	greenhouses	construction	and	 in	
tomato	 cultivation.	 From	 my	 standpoint,	 Nacho	 is	 careless	 about	 greenhouse	
management	[production],	so	I	recommend	Gerardo99	as	production	expert.	He	already	
manages	 greenhouses	 in	 Morelia’s	 region	 and	 he	 could	 be	 the	 group’s	 head	 and	

















Chapter	 3)	 had	 agreed	with	 Vicente	 on	 a	meeting	 in	 Zacapu’s	 CADER	 in	 order	 to	 sign	 the	
contracts	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses	 that	 had	 the	 authorized	 resources	 by	Alianza,	 and	 to	
endorse	 the	 corresponding	 letters	 to	 the	 greenhouses’	 provider.	 The	 appointment	 was	
scheduled	on	June	2,	2004.	Five	SPR	representatives	waited	for	Vicente	for	more	than	an	hour,	
but	he	never	arrived.	When	Rojas	(CADER’s	responsible)	received	us,	he	expected	to	see	an	
ACEA	 representative	 to	 sign	 the	 contracts	 and	 to	 release	 the	 commitment	 letters	 at	 that	
moment.	A	 letter	would	be	written	 to	 the	Operational	 Technical	 State	Unit	 (UTOE)	 as	 this	
ensured	the	correct	use	of	Alianza’s	resources	 involved	in	the	project.	During	the	meeting,	









After	 the	10	SPRs	had	 left	 the	Asociación	 to	 join	Productos	 Inocuos,	 rearrangements	were	
made	within	the	Asociación.	There	was	a	verbal	agreement	of	not	harming	each	other	at	this	
stage	of	the	project.	Moreover,	SUPLADER	appeared	to	agree	to	the	funding	of	all	28	SPRs.	The	








by	 JLB‘s	 firm	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 get	Asociación’s	 resources	 delivered	 to	 the	 trust	 fund.	 The	
meetings	described	in	this	chapter	constituted	the	first	contacts	between	the	Asociación	and	
these	 institutions	without	 JLB	 and,	 unlike	 the	 firm,	 the	Asociación’s	partners	were	 serious	
about	meeting	 the	 requirements	expressed	 in	 the	 institutional	 regulations.	Struggling	with	




























these	 reasons,	 some	 functionaries	 involved	 in	 the	 project	 identified	 themselves	 with	 the	











The	Asociación	had	started	direct	negotiations	with	 the	 institutions	specified	 in	 the	
project	document	(see	Chapter	5).	To	release	the	credit	line	it	was	necessary	to	know	in	detail	
the	 guidelines	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 institutions,	 and	 to	 strengthen	 networks	with	 banking	
agents.	 This	 work	 was	 key	 to	 unlocking	 the	 credit	 in	 accord	 to	 SEDAGRO	 (the	 executing	
institution)	 guidelines.	Meanwhile,	 the	 financial	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 facilitating	 the	
credit	 line	 required	 from	 the	 SPRs	 that	 they	 mustered	 organizing	 experience,	 productive	
	106	
capacities,	 economic	 resources,	 and	 financial	 solvency.	 These	 elements	 were	 cautiously	
evaluated	by	SPRs’	members,	in	the	expectation	of	obtaining	a	lower	interest	rate.		
The	 negotiations	 and	 learning	 processes	 generated	 disagreement	 among	 the	
Asociación’s	members	and,	when	reviewing	the	scope	of	the	project,	it	seems	they	were	going	
full	circle	and	back	to	square	one.	Some	partners	even	considered	that	their	separation	from	
JLB‘s	 firm	was	a	drawback	 to	 the	negotiations.	Meanwhile,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	adviser’s	 firm	
remained	working	with	eleven	of	the	SPRs	 in	the	new	USPR	was	not	totally	 in	 line	with	the	
Asociación’s	 decision	 of	 cancelling	 its	 services	 and	 choosing	 a	 different	 provider	 for	 the	
greenhouses.	Nevertheless,	the	Asociación	considered	that	it	was	inconvenient	to	make	the	
conflict	 transpire	 to	 the	 institutions	 during	 their	 project	 negotiations,	 so	 it	 sustained	 a	
relationship	of	respect	with	the	11	SPRs	(and	with	JLB),	looking	for	a	way	to	end	the	project	in	
a	decent	way.	
It	 was	 expected	 that	 by	 the	 time	 the	 administrative	 requirements	 to	 establish	 the	
financial	 basis	 of	 the	 project	 would	 be	 fulfilled,	 the	 resources	 would	 be	 obtained.	
Nevertheless,	every	step	in	the	process	demanded	an	endless	labyrinth	of	actions.	When	this	
problem	was	put	in	front	of	ACEA,	Abaco	was	recommended	as	a	new	firm	that	seemed	a	good	













it	 a	 lot,	 so	 the	 Asociación	 assembly	 proposed	 to	 contact	 Abaco	 and	 to	 request	 a	 work	
proposal.101	Later,	we	communicated	with	Abaco	by	phone	and	posed	them	some	technical	
questions.	 Besides,	 we	 sent	 them	 (via	 fax)	 FIRCO’s	 observations,	 specifying	 that	 the	most	
important	thing	for	the	Asociación	was	to	adjust	the	project.	











be	 approved	 by	 the	 institutions	 with	 which	 the	 Asociación	 had	 negotiated	 the	 funding,	
including	Banco	del	Bajío.	
Also,	 an	 estimate	 for	 their	 services	was	 requested	 to	 Abaco,	 and	 once	 it	 arrived	 a	
month	 later	we	checked	 it	with	Ampa	and	Chema.	They	were	charging	USD	12,000,	which	








the	 partners,	 the	 prepayment	 of	 USD	 12,000	 to	 Abaco	 was	 authorized.	 The	 amount	 paid	
protected	 the	document’s	authorship	and	some	actions	 in	 front	of	Banco	del	Bajío.	Abaco	
requested	the	version	of	the	document	be	modified	and	validated	by	different	institutions	to	
make	the	adjustments.	In	general	terms,	the	original	document	incorporated	information	of	










which	was	 considered	 to	 extend	 technological	 knowledge	 in	 different	 communities	 of	 the	
Ciénega.	
Abaco	probably	reckoned	that	it	was	more	likely	to	get	the	technical	validation	from	
the	 institutions	 for	 a	 single	 project	 than	 getting	 17	 separate	 authorizations.	 The	 proposal	




and	 technical	 advantages.	 The	 modification	 to	 have	 a	 central	 project	 was	 against	 the	
meeting’s	agreements	and	what	was	already	accepted	until	that	moment	by	the	institutions	











very	 detailed	 way	 to	 convince	 her	 to	 accept	 the	 joint	 greenhouse.	 Ampa	 seemed	 to	 be	
convinced	when	they	explained	to	her	that	there	was	no	intention	of	keeping	the	authorized	
money	for	SPR	Los	Pinos;	it	was	only	about	a	project	adjustment	to	optimize	the	resources.	
In	 the	 management	 committee,	 the	 need	 to	 keep	 the	 17	 SPRs	 together	 was	


















geographically	 distant.	 These	 SPRs	 (Purépero,	Huaniqueo,	 Tlazazalca	 and	 El	 Fresno)	would	
have	 absorb	 the	 expenses	 resulting	 from	 marketing,	 transport,	 administration	 and	
construction	requirements,	and	CONAGUA	permissions,	amongst	others.	Gonzalo	(SEPLADE)	












Humberto	 (state	 FIRCO	 technicians)	 were	 present.	 The	 PAASFIR	 as	 a	 guarantee	 fund	









trust	 of	 FOMICH,	 FIRCO,	 and	 FIRA	 (Chapter	 4),	 which	 would	 in	 turn	 support	 the	 amount	
resulting	 from	 the	bank	 loan.	On	 its	part,	 the	Asociación	negotiated	with	 the	executive	of	
Banco	del	Bajío	(Toscano)	to	take	out	the	mortgages	of	the	SPRs’	goods	and	release	the	loan.	





greenhouse.	 FIRCO	 supported	 the	 individual	 greenhouses	 in	 the	 communities,	 privileging	
agricultural	extension	through	pilot	greenhouse	construction.	Although	Abaco	ensured	that	
FIRCO	would	support	the	benefits	of	the	agro-business,	Rogelio	(FIRCO)	declared	that	such	
support	 would	 not	 be	 given,	 so	 FIRCO	 and	 FORMICH	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 withdrew	 their	
support	to	the	new	project	formula	proposed	by	Abaco.		














with	 the	 corresponding	 CONAGUA	 permit	 (an	 authorization	 for	 sufficient	 water	 supply	
required	 for	 greenhouses).	 Gonzalo	 suggested	 buying	 a	 ten	 hectares	 plot	 of	 land	 (USD	
100,000)	located	in	Zacapu	that	was	for	sale	by	Espinoza	(SPR	Marijo)	and	had	a	CONAGUA-
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3,000	 per	 hectare,	 but	 negotiations	 with	 the	 community	 authorities	 about	 the	 water	
concession	 of	 a	 deep	water	well	would	 be	 necessary.	 Some,	 like	 Chema	 (Deyna),	 Rafa	 Lp	




Apart	 from	 the	Asociación,	 Abaco	was	 negotiating	with	 another	 seller,	 Chava	 (SPR	
Maldonado),	who	offered	a	plot	of	12	hectares	for	USD	25,000/ha.	Chava	justified	the	high	




had	 invested	 more	 than	 USD	 100,000	 in	 digging	 the	 well.103	 Chava	 expressed	 that	 the	
investment	in	electric	infrastructure	had	been	his,	like	a	triphasic	pump	fed	by	a	network	of	
posts	and	a	 low-price	 transformer	 installed	by	 the	power	company	 (CFE).	The	Asociación's	
partners	 considered	 the	 price	 to	 be	 too	 high,	 arguing	 that	 it	 was	 rural	 land,	 so	 Jesús	








































Huaniqueo,	 Los	 Pinos,	 El	 Fresno).	 Some	 of	 them	modified	 their	 position,	 saying	 that	 they	
would	 be	 on	 the	 joint	 land,	 but	 in	 separate	 greenhouses.	 Abaco	 used	 the	 argument	 of	
profitability,	that	building	the	sheds	with	common	walls	could	save	materials.	This	idea	was	
later	 modified	 by	 larger,	 jointly	 administered	 sheds.	 The	 situation	 ignited	 some	 conflicts	
among	 the	 SPRs.	 Acquiring	 the	 land	 for	 the	 Asociación	 caused	 a	 change	 in	 the	 project´s	






same	 time,	 some	 activities	were	 promoted	 that	 resulted	 in	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 about	 the	

























charge	 had	 spent	USD	70,000	on	 tickets	 and	now	 required	 the	 corresponding	 repayment.	
Because	the	Asociación	rejected	to	pay,	JLB‘s	firm	threatened	with	suing	the	Asociación’s	and	





























united.	 JLB‘s	 firm’s	 strategy	 did	 have	 an	 effect	 when	 his	 financial	 office	 pressured	 some	
members	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 Lira,	 accompanied	 by	 a	 lawyer,	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 delivering	
payment	 requests	 to	 the	 members	 of	 some	 SPRs	 (Marijo,	 Purépero,	 Biotecnológicos	 and	
Laredo).	Without	giving	any	legal	proof,	Lira	demanded	payment	of	USD	3,000.00	by	each	SPR.	
These	 events	 clearly	 confused	 and	 created	 conflicts	 among	 members	 and	 their	 families.	
Fortunately,	the	threats	to	designate	them	as	debtors	of	the	credit	bureau	did	not	have	any	
effect	 (apart	 from	 the	 fact	 that	most	members	 did	 not	 understand	 the	meaning	 of	 being	
classified	as	debtor	of	such	bureau).	






negotiate	with	 Abaco	 to	 get	 their	money	 back,	 and	 to	 reduce	 the	 expenses	 spent	 on	 the	
project.	Nevertheless,	Abaco	intended	to	assign	the	amount	(the	USD	12,500)	to	elaborate	a	
commercialization	 project.	 The	 Asociación's	 management	 committee	 clarified	 that	 the	
resources	from	PRODESCA	belonged	to	the	SPRs	which	negotiated	with	Alianza,	and	that	these	
would	not	serve	to	elaborate	any	project.	Abaco	conditioned	the	negotiation	of	replacing	a	








did	 not	 agree	 with	 the	 additional	 payment,	 arguing	 that	 they	 had	 already	 paid	 their	
contribution	to	the	USD	12,000	of	the	joint	project	cost	that	was	being	used	to	manage	the	














concerning	 the	 requested	 payments.	 After	 probing	 the	 situation,	 Chema	 established	 a	
strategy,	talked	about	his	experience	managing	the	Celanese’s	Labour	Union,	and	suggested	





SPRs.	 Some	 partners	 of	 the	 management	 committee	 were	 against	 the	 proposal	 and	 no	





















would	 provide	 the	 supplies	 and	 Abaco	 would	 control	 the	 Asociación	 by	 making	 it	 fully	
dependent.	 Then,	 the	 advisors	 would	 negotiate	 the	 greenhouses’	 selling	 with	 a	 provider	
chosen	by	them,	moving	away	from	ACEA.	The	strategy	began	to	have	an	impact,	some	of	the	









gas	 heaters	 by	 diesel-fuelled	 heaters,	which	 increased	heating	 and	 irrigation	 costs	 to	USD	
600,000	 for	 the	 joint	project.	The	Spanish	suppliers	proposed	by	Abaco	would	provide	 the	
heating;	these	changes	increased	greenhouse	costs	to	USD	150,000	per	unit.	Abaco	blamed	
the	 ACEA	 provider	 for	 increasing	 the	 costs.	 Vicente	 agreed	 to	 the	 proposed	 changes	 and	
argued	that	ACEA	did	not	work	with	that	kind	of	heaters.	The	Asociación	followed	the	technical	
recommendation	 from	 Abaco.	 The	 next	 step	 of	 Abaco	 was	 to	 offer	 greenhouses	 for	 USD	
145,000	with	Richel	(France)	and	Inverca	(Spain),	claiming	a	better	quality	compared	to	ACEA	


















Abaco	 associated	with	 organizations	 that	 already	 had	 resources	 and	 advancements	 in	 the	
negotiations.	In	the	final	stage,	Abaco	seemed	to	generate	instability	and	conflicts,	when	the	
partners	had	already	invested	a	lot	in	the	project	and	would	not	want	to	abandon	it.	On	the	
other	hand,	 the	bonds	between	Félix	and	Toscano	(Banco	del	Bajío)	made	 it	easier	 for	 the	
former	to	be	a	part	of	the	Trust	Fund	of	the	Asociación.	Vicente	entrusted	to	me	a	talk	he	had	


















since	both	of	 them	wanted	 to	be	 in	charge,	 rivalry	between	 them	ensued.	 In	 this	 context,	
Abaco	 spread	 the	 rumour	 of	 a	 so-called	 preference	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	 management	














SPRs	 had	 not	 yet	 made	 their	 tax	 declaration	 at	 SHCP	 and	 this	 clearly	 showed	 a	 lack	 of	











the	 income	 statements	 of	 the	 bank.	 Mare	 considered	 that	 Ampa	 had	 compromised	 her	
function	as	 the	Asociación’s	 treasurer.	 This	 generated	a	hysteric	 reaction	 from	Mare,	who	
ended	 up	 crying,	 picking	 up	 her	 things	 and	 asking	 Malla	 (the	 alternate	 treasurer)	 to	 be	








the	 bank.	 To	 that	 purpose	 an	 assembly	 was	 organized	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 June	 2004.	 The	
assembly	 gave	 a	 trust	 vow	 to	 the	 management	 committee	 to	 propose	 an	 administrative	
structure.	Ampa	invited	Abaco	without	informing	the	partners,	just	stating	that	the	presence	
of	 an	 adviser’s	 firm	 was	 required.	 Abaco	 offered	 their	 “integral”	 services	 including	
administrative	 training.	The	assembly	agreed	on	accepting	 the	proposal,	which	 considered	
USD	10,000	to	make	the	project	“integral”,	USD	15,000	for	credit	management,	and	USD	7,500	
to	design	the	administrative	structure.	Abaco	requested	the	management	committee	not	to	




Ampa	 also	 did,	 but	 later	 on	 she	 came	 back,	 just	 when	 the	 assembly	 authorized	 the	
management	committee	to	design	the	administrative	structure.	
Ampa	did	not	agree	with	 the	way	Abaco	was	 treated,	arguing	 that	 they	had	solved	
some	problems.	I	clarified	to	the	assembly	that	by	choosing	a	firm,	particular	interests	could	
be	affected.	The	partners	knew	about	Ampa’s	and	Cristi’s	aspirations	to	have	a	position	within	
the	Asociación’s	administration.	To	solve	 this	problem,	 the	assembly	should	be	 the	one	 to	





































at	 the	 assembly,	 and	 was	 aware	 that	 it	 could	 affect	 her	 aspirations	 to	 an	 administrative	
position.	Malla	suggested	Ampa	to	present	an	administrative	proposal	 together,	but	Ampa	
refused	the	offer.	These	conflicts	would	have	consequences	for	the	Asociación	because	Mare,	
Ampa,	 Cristi	 and	 Malla	 were	 in	 charge	 of	 fundamental	 tasks	 in	 the	 project.	 After	 what	
happened,	 Ampa	 felt	 herself	 unprotected	 and	 she	 needed	 to	 team	 up	with	 someone	 she	
trusted.	I	tried	to	calm	her	down	by	clarifying	that	there	were	different	stages	in	the	project,	
that	the	administrative	phase	should	be	discussed	in	due	time,	that	the	important	thing	was	
to	 consolidate	 the	 project,	 and	 that	 it	 would	 be	 the	 partners’	 decision	 to	 define	 the	
administrative	structure.	Now	the	confrontation	between	them	was	very	clear.	Cristi	was	very	
cold-blooded	and	rude	to	Ampa,	who	intended	to	take	Malla	off	the	organization	and	blocked	



















during	 a	meeting	 to	 ask	 Esperanza	 to	 talk	 to	 SPR	 La	 Jabonera	 to	 pay	 its	 contribution,	 she	
refused,	arguing	that	she	had	to	do	other	activities.	During	this	assembly,	Chema	pointed	at	
the	 failures	 of	 Esperanza	when	 taking	 the	minutes	 of	 the	 assembly.	 Chema	was	 asked	 to	
suggest	the	nomination	of	an	alternative	to	Esperanza	as	secretary,	and	Armando	was	chosen.	






Abaco	had	shown	how	 it	 could	 influence	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 female	partners	and	
attract	their	support.	In	many	occasions,	I	had	listened	to	the	comments	of	the	women	in	the	
Asociación	(Cristi,	Mare,	and	Irma):	they	considered	Félix	a	handsome	man,	and	they	liked	his	
expressions	 and	 gestures,	which	 influenced	 them.	Others	with	 a	 stronger	 personality,	 like	
Malla	 and	 Esperanza,	 seemed	 not	 to	 bother	 and	 expressed	 their	 concern	 noticing	 the	






While	 the	 trust	 fund	was	 tried	 to	be	 created,	 expecting	 the	 contribution	of	 10	percent	 of	
greenhouse	 cost	 (USD	 15,000	 for	 each	 SPR)	 to	 be	 deposited	 before	 the	 end	 of	 July	 2004,	
SEPLADE	argued	that	after	that	date	they	would	not	be	able	to	stop	the	process,	and	the	SPRs	
that	did	not	get	the	credit	line	would	be	excluded	from	the	project.	For	this	reason,	Ampa	and	
Mare	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 SPRs,	 demanding	 their	 respective	 contributions,	
particularly	 the	 SPRs	 of	 La	 Piedad	 Chiquita,	 Bajo	 Invernadero,	 Comanja,	 Movimiento	
Ciudadano	de	Mujeres,	La	Jabonera	de	Tlazazalca,	Cortijo	Nuevo	and	Huaniqueo.	The	ways	in	
which	 pressure	 was	 exercised	 caused	 tension	 within	 the	 Asociación;	 some	 of	 them	 even	








the	 project	 was	 through	 their	 financial	 contribution.	 Following	 this	 approach,	 regional	
development	imposed	conditions	that	would	exclude	some	actors	and	favour	others.	Still,	the	
organizing	 incompatibility	 of	 some	 of	 the	 SPRs	 obstructed	 the	mobility	 of	 others	who	 did	
invest	 in	 the	 project.	 For	 example,	 the	 SPRs	 of	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 Bajo	 Invernadero	 and	
Movimiento	 Ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres	 one	 day	 accepted	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	
	120	
management,	 and	 a	 few	 days	 later	 threatened	 with	 their	 withdrawal.	 The	 inconsistent	
behaviour	 of	 these	 SPRs	 affected	 project	 planning,	 so	 Chema	 and	 Jesús	 demanded	 these	







about	 paying	 interest	 for	 a	 credit	 he	 had	 taken	 up	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 his	 contribution.	 The	
members	of	Cortijo	Nuevo	did	not	want	to	continue	with	the	project,	and	Trujillo	expressed	
his	withdrawal	before	 the	assembly,	 requesting	 the	 return	of	his	 contribution.	Chema	and	
Jesús	(Trujillo’s	companions	on	the	Zacapu	town	hall)	thought	that	Trujillo	had	been	irregular	











For	 several	 days,	 the	 SPRs	were	 approached	 to	 finally	 agree	on	 the	 return	of	 their	
contribution.	The	next	assembly	served	to	release	tensions	and	to	look	for	the	cause	of	their	










as	 its	 representative	 and	 René	 Guizar	 took	 over,	 while	 Rosario	 stayed	 as	 treasurer	 and	
Sebastián	Loya,	brother	of	Pedro	Loya	and	Baltazar	from	Tiríndaro,	joined.	On	June	24th,	2004	








the	 organization	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 The	 translation	 process	 modified	 the	 SPR	 internal	
structure,	thus	avoiding	a	revalidation	of	the	records	as	a	new	SPR.	Gonzalo	suggested	that	





already	 participating.	 Displacements	 in	 the	 actor-network	 show	 that	 the	 repertoire	 of	
translation	is	not	only	designed	to	give	a	symmetrical	and	tolerant	description	of	a	complex	






The	 credit	 line	amount	established	on	 the	project	document	was	USD	2.3	million,	 and	 the	






The	 negotiation	 of	 the	 credit	 line	 also	 included	 several	 joint	 guarantors111	 and	 a	




and	 Esperanza	 agreed	 on	 working	 with	 joint	 guarantors,	 under	 the	 condition	 of	 having	 a	
contingency	 fund	during	at	 least	 two	years;	 the	 fund	would	allow	softening	payments	and	
interests	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 project.	 Then	 the	 bank	 proposed	 to	 consider	 a	 liquid	
guarantee	of	one	to	one,	the	release	of	the	FIRCO,	FIRA,	and	FINCA	resources,	and	to	elaborate	
agreements	between	the	Asociación	and	the	SPRs.	
To	 reduce	 investment	 risks,	 the	Asociación	 proposed	 to	 the	bank	 to	 start	with	 five	
greenhouses,	which	Toscano	considered	appropriate.	He	asked	to	visit	the	Asociación’s	land,	
where	the	greenhouses	would	be	installed,	and	be	allowed	to	review	the	water	permissions.	














detract	 ACEA	 company	 works	 from	 La	 Piedad	 greenhouses,	 ensuring	 that	 there	 was	
inappropriate	management	of	the	cultivation	by	Valadez	from	inappropriate	conditions	of	the	
greenhouse.	Félix	said:	“We’ve	talked	with	Toscano	and	he	puts	as	a	condition	to	release	the	
loan	 that	 the	Asociación	 signs	with	 the	 same	advisory	office	 that	prepared	 the	project,	 to	
follow	up	and	consolidate	the	trust	fund”	(Felix,	SEPLADE	hall,	5/7/2004).	
I	spoke	to	the	partners	to	inform	them	that	the	assembly	was	finished	and	that	the	


























glasses,	Félix	said:	“We	all	need	a	piece	of	 the	cake”.	 I	 turned	around	and	 left	 (Restaurant	
Aleman,	5/7/2004).		














conditioned	to	 the	authorization	 from	other	 financial	 sources,	and	these	depended	on	the	
credit	line,	the	answer	to	the	bank	was	integrated	into	the	file	that	each	SPR	had	with	SEPLADE.	



























requirement	 of	 the	 10%	 contribution	 to	 the	 project,	 so	 the	Asociación	would	 provide	 the	
support	and	authorized	credit	 line.	The	strategy	was	 to	start	using	 the	capital	 that	did	not	
generate	 interest	before,	and	using	the	 loan	to	equip	the	greenhouses	as	this	would	allow	
starting	the	production	stage	immediately.		










the	 right	 strategies	 to	 follow	 in	 the	 greenhouses’	 project.	 As	 progress	 in	 the	 negotiations	




greenhouse	products).	As	 I	 have	 shown,	each	 firm	came	equipped	with	 its	own	networks,	
which	 included	greenhouse	companies,	agencies,	organizations	and	credit	negotiators.	The	
advisory	 firms	 did	 not	 share	 their	 networks,	 but	 only	 the	 services	 they	 offered	 to	 obtain	
resources	from	the	SPRs	in	exchange,	promising	them	to	compensate	the	elevated	costs	at	









































SEPLADE	of	Zacapu,	different	governmental	 trends	coexisted,	 ranging	 from	Julio	Moguel115	






of	 Guanajuato.	 Some	 SEPLADE	 officers	 like	 Julio	 Moguel,	 Pedro	 Velázquez	 and	 Leoncio	
Lagunas	were	not	convinced	of	the	organizing	processes	regarding	the	Alternative	Agricultural	
Model	 (MAA)	 that	 Gonzalo	 had	 promoted	 in	 the	 region	 of	 Ciénega	 de	 Zacapu.	When	 he	
stepped	down	from	his	position	in	Zacapu,	SEPLADE	directors	saw	it	as	the	right	moment	to	
change	the	SEPLADE	strategy.	














































scheduled	 this	 kind	 of	 informal	 meetings	 separate	 from	 the	 invitation	 sent	 out	 by	 the	

















as	 Félix	 knew	 that	 gossip	was	 used	 in	 Zacapu	 to	 discredit	 people.	 Immediately	 hereafter,	
Abaco	made	its	return	to	the	Asociación,	on	three	conditions:	i)	The	bank	would	give	support	
only	 if	 Abaco	 participated;	 ii)	 The	 supplier	 would	 be	 changed,	 arguing	 that	 there	 were	
deficiencies	in	the	ACEA	greenhouses	of	La	Piedad	(advised	by	Valadez);	and,	iii)	I	had	to	quit	
leadership	 of	 the	Asociación	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 Abaco’s	 intention	was	 to	 get	me	 out	 of	 the	
managing	committee	in	order	to	consolidate	its	strategy	of	“going	for	the	dough".	Abaco	had	
convinced	Cristi,	Ampa	and	Mare,	and	they	explained	the	return	of	Abaco	to	Chema.	The	links	
between	 the	 SPRs	 of	 Maldonado,	 Marijo,	 Deyna,	 Puerta	 Chica	 and	 Las	 Delicias	 was	 very	
narrow	and	they	agreed	upon	Abaco’s	proposals.	
Ampa	was	betting	on	getting	the	Abaco	contract	in	this	fast-track	meeting,	but	to	do	






read	a	 letter	 in	which	she	mentioned	a	specific	date	 (in	 two	weeks’	 time)	to	complete	the	



























also	 gave	 me	 her	 vote	 of	 confidence.	 Manuel	 (Las	 Delicias)	 and	 Manuel	 (El	 Fresno)	 also	
supported	me;	Espinoza	did	the	same	and	gave	me	a	pat	on	the	back	saying,	“Chin	up!”.	The	
assembly	 did	 not	 accept	my	 resignation	 and,	 once	 again	 the	 hiring	 of	 Abaco	 failed.	 Some	
partners	however	(most	notably	Chema,	Ampa	and	Cristi)	would	not	give	up	their	attempts.	
On	July	28,	2004,	a	meeting	was	called	according	to	the	statutes,	in	writing	and	with	
prior	 notice,	 and	most	 of	 the	 partners	 attended.	 In	 a	 clear	 act	 of	 obstruction,	 Cristi	 and	
Armando	 forced	 Julio	 César,	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 SPR	 Biotecnológicos,	 to	 leave	 the	
assembly,	trying	to	prevent	that	the	necessary	quorum	(more	than	50%)	would	be	reached.	
The	SPRs	that	supported	Chema	agreed	not	to	attend	the	meeting	as	a	way	to	infringe	upon	








and	 argued	 that	 this	 would	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 all	 SPRs	 contributed	 the	 same	 amount	 of	








meantime,	 tried	 to	 recompose	 the	 Biotecnológicos	 group	 by	 talking	 to	 Ricardo	 about	 the	
proposal	approved	by	the	assembly.	Gonzalo	explained:	
	
If	 the	group	of	SPRs	that	 identifies	with	the	Asociación	builds	 the	greenhouses	on	the	
land	belonging	to	the	Asociación,	it	will	be	mortgaged.	The	President	of	the	Asociación	
supports	this	proposal	and	can	count	on	the	majority	of	the	SPRs,	and	the	block	of	five	










Campos	 (SUPLADER’s	 President),	Heredia	 (Productos	 Inocuos),	 Cristi	 and	Armando.	 Chema	
presented	a	list	of	the	Asociación’s	SPRs	and	the	authorized	amounts.	It	was	then	decided	who	
should	be	 supported	and	under	what	 conditions.	 It	was	 instructed	 that	 an	 additional	USD	












of	 the	 Biotecnológicos	 SPR,	 Armando	 and	 Cristi	 made	 him	 leave,	 saying	 he	 was	 “one	 of	
Fidencio’s	 people”	 and	 therefore	 he	 should	 not	 be	 there.	 Shortly	 afterwards,	 Julio	 César	
decided	to	leave	because,	as	he	said,	“I	did	not	know	how	to	act	in	that	situation”	(Julio	Cesar’s	
house,	29/07/2004).	In	the	meeting,	the	SPRs	decided	to	send	a	letter	to	Banco	del	Bajío	in	












displacements	 and	 substitutions	 inside	 of	 the	 Asociación,	 implying	 that	 certain	 networks	












that	the	SUPLADER	resources	 (MAA)	were	being	diverted	to	 finance	a	road.120	 I	knew	how	




were	 invited	 in	 order	 to	 present	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 situation	 to	 Julio	 Moguel.	 Due	 to	 his	
relationship	with	the	Cárdenas	family,	Moguel	had	participated	as	social	and	rural	advisor	in	























version	 of	 the	 facts	 seemed	 distorted	 and	 rough.	 The	 management	 committee	 of	 the	
Asociación	affirmed	that	the	negotiation	had	been	satisfactory	(in	terms	of	starting	with	five	
greenhouses),	 and	 that	 the	 records	 had	 been	 ratified	 with	 SEPLADE.	 Leoncio	 (the	 new	
SEPLADE	Zacapu	delegate),	 in	his	attempt	to	pull	away,	said	that	he	did	not	know	anything	
about	the	project’s	 inception	phase	and	that	he	did	not	know	about	the	Asociación’s	 files.	
SEPLADE	 officials	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 events	 and	 took	 notes	 about	 the	 meeting’s	 details,	
particularly	René	Sosa,	who	often	instructed	Cristi	outside	the	room.	






























































not	 know	what	 to	 say.	With	 this,	Abaco	withdrew.	Chema	and	 Leoncio’s	 strategy	had	not	
worked,	as	I	had	been	fortunate	enough	to	arrive	a	little	earlier	to	talk	about	the	matters	in	
which	the	Asociación	could	get	sucked	into.	











their	 new	 allies,	 SEPLADE	 officials	 now	 entered	 a	 phase	 that	 showed	 the	 firm	 hand	 of	



































the	 assembly	 proceedings	 in	 which	 Malla	 was	 ratified	 as	 the	 Asociación’s	 treasurer,	 and	
Mare’s	resignation	was	put	before	to	the	notary,	Ernestina.	Later,	when	I	returned	to	pick	up	





Asociación.	 Heredia	 insisted	 on	 going	 to	 the	meeting	 and	 assured	 that	 the	 new	 SEPLADE	





Productos	 Inocuos,	 USPR	 Agricola	 Tsakapu,	 Abaco	 and	 JLB’s	 firm.	 The	 network	 would	 be	
reconfigured	by	recovering	Heredia’s	prior	leadership	of	the	Asociación	before	I	replaced	him.		
In	the	assembly	scheduled	for	September	18,	2004,	the	management	committee	of	the	
Asociación	 attended	 so	 that	 the	president	 could	 comply	with	 the	 subjects	 on	 the	 agenda.	
Nevertheless,	 when	 I	 tried	 to	 start	 the	 meeting,	 Chema	 and	 Jesús	 interrupted	 me	 in	 an	
aggressive	way,	saying	 that	 they	were	suspended	 in	 their	 rights	as	partners,	and	that	 they	
were	supported	by	representatives	of	other	SPRs	that	were	no	longer	part	of	the	Asociación.	
After	the	assembly	was	deemed	invalid,	various	SPRs	left.	Those	who	stayed	in	the	assembly	
named	 Chema	 as	 leader	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 Cristi	 as	 secretary	 (although	 she	 was	 not	 a	









president	 and	 secretary,	 respectively,	 whose	 institutions	 recognized	 the	 USPRs	 Productos	
Inocuos	and	the	Asociación.	There	was	a	record	in	the	SUPLADER	proceedings	that	they	had	
been	acting	independently	since	March	2004.	It	 is	necessary	to	highlight	that	 in	one	of	the	
items	 on	 the	 assembly’s	 proceedings,	 a	 reference	 was	 made	 to	 the	 “abandonment”	 of	
Fidencio	who	until	that	time	was	president	in	charge;	while	some	lines	down	I	was	mentioned	
as	acting	president	and	Malla	was	named	as	acting	treasurer	in	charge.	With	this,	it	became	
evident	 that	 there	 were	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 acknowledgments	 of	 appointments	 that	
followed	the	creation	of	the	Asociación,	including	the	moment	when	Chema’s	SPR	had	entered	
the	Asociación.	
In	 this	 same	meeting,	 Jesús	mentioned	 the	 plot	 named	 Fracción	de	 la	Mesa	 Prieta	
located	in	Carátacua,	Coeneo	municipality	that	was	acquired	by	the	Asociación,	stating	that	“a	
purchase	agreement	with	 the	Asociación’s	 representatives	has	been	reached”.	Afterwards,	
Chema	 proposed	 the	 sale	 of	 the	 plot	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 USD	 110,000;	 this	was	 approved	
unanimously	and	“El	Derecho	al	Tanto”127	was	offered	to	the	attendees,	without	there	being	
any	intention	to	purchase	it	expressed	by	any	of	the	attendees.	
Following	this,	 the	 financial	contribution	of	 the	Asociación	was	discussed	 in	general	
terms.	 Irma	proposed	 returning	 the	contributions	 to	 the	partners,	which	was	unanimously	





























































to	 impugn	 the	 assembly	 of	 September	 18,	 you’ll	 know	what	 I’m	 capable	 of”	 (Ampa,	 Villa	


















Tzakapu’s	 control.	 In	order	 to	protect	 partners	 like	El	 Campeón	 and	Malla,	 the	Asociación	
denounced	the	event	and	made	Enrique	Bautista	responsible	for	the	security	of	its	partners.	
From	his	side,	Chema	put	pressure	on	the	SPRs	of	Huaniqueo	and	El	Fresno	to	continue	with	
Agrícola	 Tsakapu,	 as	 they	 wanted	 to	 leave.	 Huaniqueo’s	 president	 considered	 that	 SPR	





























The	 land’s	 deed	 was	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Asociación,	 signed	 by	 its	 president	 as	

























fault.	We	 have	 spent	 thousands	 of	 USD	 on	 this	 project:	 USD	 12,000	 for	 JLB,	 9,000	 for	





















that	 Leoncio	 Lagunas	 considered	 acceptable.	 USPR	 Productos	 Inocuos	 had	 obtained	 the	
endorsement	of	one	SOFOL130	as	guarantee	for	their	social	contribution.	In	that	meeting,	the	
money	for	Productos	Inocuos	and	Agricola	Tsakapu	were	authorized.	
Meanwhile,	 Salvador	 (SEDAGRO)	asked	me	 to	meet	him	 in	a	 restaurant	 in	Morelia.	
There,	Salvador	assured	me	that	the	Asociación’s	resources	could	be	authorized	for	the	pilot	
plan	for	the	five	greenhouses,	the	requirement	being	that	all	of	us	would	be	the	beneficiaries	
and	 that	 some	 SPRs	 would	 have	 to	 make	 their	 contributions.	 With	 this,	 he	 made	 me	
understand	that	a	tacit	agreement	was	necessary	“for	the	money	to	flow”.	This	did	not	seem	
ethical	so	 I	 refused,	replying	that	 I	would	consult	the	partners	first.	Like	Abaco	before,	the	
SEDAGRO	officer	made	his	conditions	(a	share	of	the	project	money	-	la	lana)	clear	in	order	to	















Chema	 had	 regularly	 been	made	 beneficiary	 of	 sums	 of	money:	 in	 2003,	 for	 example,	 he	
received	USD	75,000	from	Alianza	(PAPIR)	to	be	spent	in	Coeneo;	also,	in	2004	he	received	USD	
158,000	 from	 Fomento	 Agrícola	 to	 be	 spent	 in	 Zacapu.	 To	 put	 this	 in	 perspective:	 As	 a	
comparison,	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 2004	Alianza	 para	 el	 Campo	 only	 spent	 USD	 11,000	 in	 the	
















was	 validated	 by	 SEDAGRO.	 What	 had	 actually	 been	 constructed	 was	 equivalent	 to	 an	
investment	of	only	one	unit	of	two	hectares,	but	at	a	cost	of	USD	350,000	-	which	meant	a	
price	 inflation	of	 600%.	 To	 implement	 the	project,	 the	 institutions	did	not	 check	 the	 legal	
status	of	the	land,	which	was	the	property	of	the	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	and	listed	as	such	at	
the	Public	Registry.	



































SEPLADE	 02	 with	 SUPLADER	 funds.	 But,	 although	 SUPLADER	 was	 founded	 as	 a	 regional	
development	 body,	 it	 was	 reduced	 to	 a	 space	 for	 political	 games	 as	 a	 result	 of	 actors’	
appropriation.	 During	 Enrique	 Bautista’s	 (PRD)	 campaign	 as	 candidate	 for	 the	Michoacán	
government,	the	greenhouses’	project	was	reborn	by	deviating	the	resources	from	SUPLADER	
02.	This	involved	Enrique	Bautista	with	a	network	of	collaborators	from	the	State	government,	
using	 SUPLADER	 and	 the	 regional	 delegate,	 Leoncio	 Lagunas,	 as	 change	 agent.	 With	 the	






USPR	Agricola	 Tsakapu	 were	 used	 as	 a	 case	 in	 point	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 regional	
development	was	indeed	possible.	However,	the	internal	conflicts	that	caused	the	retreat	of	








to	 support	 the	SUPLADER	municipalities,	although	 in	practice	 they	were	only	 interested	 in	
their	 own	 agenda.	According	 to	 actors	 such	 as	 Pedro	 (SEPLADE),	 the	 rest	 of	 SUPLADER	of	
Michoacán	 had,	 from	 the	 beginning,	 used	 the	 resources	without	 the	 actors’	 organization,	
which	meant	that	the	disbursements	could	lead	to	the	expected	goals	in	due	time	by	applying	
institutional	 planning	 from	 the	 top	 down	 -	with	 Zacapu	 as	 the	 exception.	 Before	merging	
SUPLADER	 Zacapu	with	 SUPLADER	 Bajío,	 the	 authorized	 resources	 for	 the	 region	 had	 been	
exerted	through	a	direct	disbursement	on	newly	agreed	works	–	roads,	for	example.	This	way,	




inherited	 the	money-related	 problems.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 remaining	 resources	 of	 the	
Ciénega	region	(USD	10	million)	were	moved	to	the	Bajío	region.		
The	 asociación´s	 game	 continued	 with	 different	 actors,	 and	 different	 projects.	 In	
Chapter	5	we	have	learned	about	the	dissociation	of	the	Asociación	leading	to	the	formation	
of	USPR	Productos	Inocuos.	This	chapter	has	described	how	some	of	the	Asociación’s	funds	









articulate	 previously	 agreed-upon	 action.	 Fights	 and	 disagreements	 within	 the	Asociación	
promote	splits	that	impact	its	formal	representation.	
The	reunion	of	Zacapu’s	SPRs	in	Agrícola	Tsakapu	 is	 in	 line	to	Chassen-Lopez	(2004)	
who	 states	 that	 actor’s	 relations	 can	 often	 count	 on	 their	 historical	 collaboration	 and	
economic	investments	to	contract	the	services	of	legal	agents	and	consulting	firms.	A	strategy	
used	 by	 this	 new	 network	 was	 to	 monopolize	 the	 Asociación’s	 resources,	 looking	 to	
disarticulate	it,	even	if	they	failed	to	do	so.		
Organizing	processes	were	split	due	to	internal	and	external	factors,	highlighting	the	
many	 expectations	 that	 generated	 the	 various	 projects	 and	 commitments	 made	 during	
collective	 management.	 The	 game	 of	 the	 SPRs	 triggered	 a	 set	 of	 strategies	 and	 multiple	
practices.	 First,	 they	 tried	 to	 obtain	 the	 funding	 for	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 through	 the	
management	of	Gonzalo	as	SEPLADE	delegate.	Then,	after	his	replacement,	they	sought	to	
obtain	the	money	directly	through	negotiations	with	the	new	delegate,	Leoncio	Lagunas.	The	











This	 study	 is	about	 the	 implementation	of	a	 regional	development	program	 in	Michoacán,	
Mexico.	 The	 program	 aimed	 to	 introduce	 greenhouses	 for	 the	 production	 of	 tomatoes	
through	 hydroponic	 systems,	 and	was	 promoted	 by	 the	 Subcomité	 de	 Planeación	 para	 el	













This	 research	 centres	 on	 the	 efforts	 to	 materialize	 the	 greenhouse	 project.	 The	
beneficiaries	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 were	 organized	 in	 Societies	 for	 Rural	 Production	
(SPRs).	In	order	to	be	eligible	to	access	project	resources,	the	SPRs	needed	to	create	a	higher-
level	 organization,	 a	 Union	 of	 Societies	 for	 Rural	 Production	 (Unión	 de	 Sociedades	 de	
Producción	Rural)	or	USPR.)	The	SPRs	that	are	the	focus	of	this	this	thesis	were	united	in	a	USPR	
called	 Unión	 de	 Invernaderos	 Ruta	 de	 la	 Libertad	 (which	 I	 have	 called	 the	 Asociación	
throughout	the	thesis).		Some	of	the	intended	beneficiaries,	acting	as	representatives	of	the	
SPRs,	 had	 previous	 experience	 in	 organizing	 and	 participating	 in	 projects	 similar	 to	 the	





actions.	 The	 main	 concepts	 I	 used	 to	 analyse	 my	 data	 are	 agency,	 knowledge,	 interface,	
associations,	and	organizing	process.	In	reflexively	answering	the	research	questions,	I	have	































stakeholder	 participation	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 (Chapters	 2	 and	 3).	 Three,	 actors’	
articulation	with	organizational	processes	(Chapters	3	and	4).	Four,	the	positioning	of	State	










conclusions.	 First,	 the	development	project	 for	 the	establishment	of	28	greenhouses	 in	 La	
Ciénega	 (Zacapu)	 resulted	 from	 very	 complex	 negotiations	 caused	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	







evidenced	 in	 this	 case	 study.	Of	 course,	 the	 actors	who	 promulgate,	 develop,	 orchestrate	
regulations	 and	 authorize	 resources	 for	 projects,	 are	 also	 capable	 of	 redesigning	 project	












however,	 that	 provokes	 negotiations	 and	 ruptures	 as	 well	 as	 agreements	 and	 new	
entanglements	that	result	from	social	interfaces.	
	
The	 second	 conclusion	 follows	 from	 the	 first,	 namely	 that	 the	 intervention	process	
involves	actor	negotiations	and	network	enrolment	which	may	disrupt	or	frustrate	planned	
objectives,	substituting	these	by	those	of	 the	actors	caught	up	 in	 the	process.	SUPLADER’s	
development	planning	-	which	originally	saw	beneficiaries	as	generic	and	faceless	subjects	-	





















project	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 “real”	 stakeholders,	 their	 historicity,	 or	 actors’	 networks,	
resources,	organizing	practices,	or	differential	development	perspective.	The	Asociación	was	





conflictive	 -	 needs	 and	 demands	 of	 multiple	 actors.	 In	 the	 greenhouse	 case	 regulations,	
assembly	agreements,	funding	applications,	authorizations,	records,	and	validations	were	all	
expected	to	contribute	to	the	project’s	cohesion.	However,	in	practice	actors	representing	the	








project	 resources.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 only	 by	 mustering	 the	 "appropriate"	 networks	 and	
connections	would	they	get	hold	of	the	desired	benefits	(see	Chapter	7).		
	
The	 third	conclusion	 is	 that	project	 implementation	 triggered	other	dynamic	and	historical	






of	 resistance	to	gain	sovereignty	and	autonomy.	 In	 this	sense,	 they	exemplify	Fuentes	and	
Mantilla’s	statement	that	"there	is	no	pure	or	total	domination	that	cannot	be	transformed"	
(2010:3).	The	processes	associated	with	the	greenhouse	project	shaped	the	relations	between	


















In	 2002	 the	 State	 Development	 Plan	 included	 guidelines	 and	 general	 directions	 for	 La	
Ciénega’s	 development.	 The	 Agricultural	 Alternative	Model	 (MAA)	 was	 based	 on	 a	 Cuban	
development	model.	The	MAA	was	backed	by	governor	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel	and	by	SEPLADE	






Lázaro	 Cárdenas	 del	 Río.	 Development	 must	 be	 understood	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 political,	





elements	 to	 an	 underdeveloped	 country	 deemed	 to	 lack	 the	 capacity	 and	 capability	 of	
improving	 the	 lives	 of	 development	 beneficiaries.	 Interestingly,	 La	 Ciénega’s	 development	
initiatives	came	from	Cuba,	a	nation	economically	less	developed	than	Mexico.	In	addition,	
SUPLADER’s	 investment	 was	 not	 linked	 to	 any	 developed	 establishment	 (Ferguson,	 1994)	
wishing	to	orchestrate	an	intervention.	Actually,	Michoacán’s	Administration,	in	an	effort	to	















the	 arena	 by	 an	 increasing	 diversity	 of	 stakeholders,	 collective	 participation	 was	









with	 Mosse’s	 (2005)	 analysis	 and	 contradict	 the	 interpretations	 of	 planned	 development	





Chapter	 7,	 new	 and	 ancient	 allies	 were	 re-associated;	 Heredia	 for	 example	 (as	 former	
president	of	the	Asociación)	accepted	the	new	rules	proposed	by	Abaco	and	SEPLADE	(Leoncio	
and	Francisco).	The	project	benefitted	by	obtaining	“the	dough”.		





were	 based	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	 successfully	 implementating	 a	 politically	 motivated	
development	model	for	Ciénega	de	Zacapu.	The	authorizations	for	the	project	implied	to	mask	
and	 accomplish	 a	 planned	 intervention	 project	 that	 justified	 development,	 hiding	 the	
networks’	 agreements	 and	 actors’	 negotiations.	 This	 collaboration	 occurred	 between	 the	
officials	 of	 the	 institutions	 linked	 to	 the	 SPRs,	 and	who	were	 simultaneously	 part	 of	 both	
networks.		
Diego	(2010)	states	that,	due	to	different	 interested	factions,	 the	 implementers	are	
more	likely	to	redirect	the	execution	of	a	program	or	a	government	project	than	the	officials	
at	 State	 level.	 Likewise,	 Long	 (2007)	has	 argued	 that	 such	mid-level	 development	workers	
need	to	implement	all	manner	of	regulations,	but	that	they,	at	the	same	time,	may	become	
involved	 in	 negotiations	 to	 find	 alternatives	 to	 the	 normativity	 they	 represent.	 These	
practices,	which	are	often	unrelated	to	the	original	planning	process,	have	a	resemblance	with	
the	rural	credit	businesses	mentioned	by	Gordillo	 (1999),	 for	example	when	 implementers	
	 149	




the	 technological	 changes	 that	 came	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 greenhouses	 and	
hydroponic	production.	JBL’s	firm	and	Abaco	understood	this.		For	the	former,	the	greenhouse	








Because	networks	 decompose	 and	 recompose,	 interfaces	 also	 find	 themselves	 in	 a	
continuous	and	dynamic	process	of	modification.	The	 sum	total	of	 the	different	 interfases	
strengthen	the	actor-network	experience	at	subsequent	interface	situations.	In	the	present	
study,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Asociación	 granted	 accreditation	 to	 experienced	 actors	 for	
representing	them	during	management	negotiations.	However,	after	the	representatives	had	











This	 study	 reveals	 the	dynamic	practices	and	concurrent	use	of	 resources	 that	accompany	
development	in	a	region	of	Michoacán,	Mexico.	It	seeks	to	show	how	these	dynamics	are	best	
interpreted	through	the	use	of	an	actor-oriented	approach.	In	Mexico,	only	a	handful	of	case	
studies	 make	 use	 of	 such	 an	 ethnographic,	 actor-oriented	 approach	 to	 understand	
development	intervention	processes.	The	approach	shows	that	when	resources	are	added	to	
an	 existing	 network,	 the	 network	 is	 reconfigured	 without	 interrupting	 its	 main	 purpose,	
namely	to	devise	strategies	in	pursuit	of	project	resources.	

















were	 involved,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 but	 also	 elsewhere.	
However,	 since	my	objectives	often	differed	 from	 those	of	 the	 actors	 and	 their	 networks,	
these	 bonds	 remained	 fragile	 and	 in	 need	 of	 continuous	 examination	 and	 readjustment.	





individual	 actors	 who	 were	 not	 associated	 with,	 or	 perhaps	 opposed,	 to	 the	 networks	 I	
became	involved	in.	Indeed,	since	I	constantly	engaged	in	the	processes	I	studied,	I	became	a	
part	 of	 the	 research	object	 itself.	 This	may	have	 jeopardised	my	neutrality.	 Even	 though	 I	
continuously	reflected	on	the	relationship	I	had	with	my	co-actors	in	the	greenhouse	project,	




Actively	 becoming	 a	 part	 of	 the	 research	object	 of	 course	diverges	 from	orthodox,	
textbook	methodologies	and	epistemological	canons.	As	I	argued	in	the	introduction,	though,	
these	issues	are	always	present	in	research	because	of	the	performative	nature	of	research	








taken	 into	 account.	 For	 those	 researchers	 who	 have	 previous	 links	 to	 the	 study	 area,	 I	
recommend	 to	 strengthen	 a	 historical	 and	 critical	 perspective.	 Incorporating	 alternative	
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research	methods	 such	as	auto-ethnography,	allowed	 to	 include	personal	experiences	and	
autobiographical	reflections.	To	"newcomers"	or	foreigners	to	the	area	I	advise	to	seriously	












they	 cared	 to	 take	me.	Participatory	Approach	Research	 (PAR)	was	used	when	 I	had	been	
enrolled	in	specific	actions.	Using	Actor-Oriented	Approach	in	parallel	with	PAR	implies	‘going	
with	 the	actors’,	 sharing	commitments	and	goals.	 I	needed	to	be	closely	 involved	with	 the	
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This	 study	 follows	 a	 planned	 development	 intervention	 involving	 greenhouse	 production	








study	 aims	 to	 understand	 the	 character	 of	 intervention,	 and	 shows	 how	 programs	 and	
development	projects	serve	different	purposes	–	purposes	which	symbiotically	relate	to	the	
prevailing	social	conditions.	As	a	general	conclusion,	I	argue	that	what	is	called	“the	dough”	









Chapter	 2	 describes	 the	 organizing	 processes	 underlying	 implementation	 of	 the	
greenhouse	 project	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 -	 Ciénega	 region.	 It	 explains	 how,	 in	 order	 to	 acquire	
resources	 for	 the	 project,	 stakeholders	 organized	 into	 groups,	 forming	 Rural	 Production	
Associations	(SPRs)	and	Unions	of	Rural	Producers’	Associations	(USPRs).	As	a	result,	a	total	of	
28	 SPRs	 were	 formed.	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 members	 of	 these	 SPRs	 had	 extensive,	 prior	
experience	 in	 organizing	 and	 participating	 in	 programs	 similar	 to	 those	 promoted	 by	
SUPLADER.		
Chapter	3	describes	the	practices	of	the	eight	groups	(SPR)	who	got	no	resources	from	
SUPLADER	 and	 seek	 to	 compensate	 for	 an	 initial	 investment	 from	 the	 Alliance	 for	 the	









to	 exercise	 governmental	 programs,	 the	 parties	 responsible	 for	 exercising	 them	 applied	
ambiguous	criteria.		
Chapter	4	describes	the	development	of	an	 ideal	configuration	of	greenhouses	that	
included	 technological,	 social	 and	 cultural	 elements	 associated	 with	 safety	 practices,	
automation	and	demanding	consumers	 located	 in	an	 international	market.	This	perception	
was	far	from	the	project	conditions	of	greenhouses	in	La	Ciénega;	however,	it	did	not	prevent	
generating	 expectations	 among	 the	 SPRs.	 For	 these	 actors,	 the	 greenhouse	 became	 an	
alternative	livelihood,	income,	and	development	opportunity.	
	To	interpret	the	processes	described	I	used	Latour’s	(2008)	notion	of	a	sociology	of	










Chapter	 7	 presents	 the	 final	 stage	 of	 SUPLADER	 Zacapu’s	 greenhouse	 project.	 After	
complex	negotiations	and	conflicts	within	the	Asociación,	complementary	credit	was	obtained	
for	the	construction	of	the	greenhouse.	However,	during	a	municipal	election	campaign	key	
figures	 in	 charge	 of	 implementation	 changed	 position;	 this	 led	 to	 a	 change	 in	 project	
conditions,	and	the	Asociación	had	to	face	interventions	from	external	actors.	The	negotiation	
game	restarted	and	triggered	a	new	set	of	strategies	(amongst	others	to	obtain	money	directly	
through	 the	 new	 SEPLADE	 delegate).	 Eventually,	 some	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	 funds	 were	
reappropriated	 and	 assigned	 to	USPR	Agrícola	 Tsakapu	 and	 different	 factions	 (vying	 for	 of	
resources)	resulted	fom	this.		
Chapter	8	provides	the	discussion	and	conclusion	to	this	thesis,	with	insights	that	build	
on	 Mosse’s	 (2005)	 argument	 that	 policies	 to	 promote	 development	 are	 associated	 to	
organizational	demands	and	needs	to	maintain	existing	relationships	(rather	than	promoting	
a	 previously	 defined	 policy).	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 La	 Ciénega,	 the	 agents	 of	 change	
(including	the	Michoacán	Congress)	supported	and	pushed	through	planners’	development	
initiatives.	In	line	with	Ferguson	(1994),	I	conclude	that	development	must	be	understood	in	
relation	 to	 the	 political-economic-cultural	 interests	 of	 those	 behind	 its	 design	 and	

















entender	 el	 carácter	 de	 la	 intervención,	 y	 muestra	 cómo	 se	 entrelazan	 las	 normativas	 y	




contextos	 de	 intervención:	 para	 los	 planificadores,	 es	 el	 medio	 para	 lograr	 el	 desarrollo,	
mientras	que	para	los	beneficiarios	del	proyecto	puede	ser	un	objetivo	en	sí	mismo.	
El	capítulo	1	muestra	el	contexto	general	de	la	intervención	planeada	en	la	región	de	
Zacapu	 de	 Michoacán,	 delimita	 el	 marco	 teórico,	 presenta	 la	 pregunta	 de	 investigación:	
¿Cómo	los	actores	se	organizan	alrededor	del	proyecto	de	invernaderos	y	cómo	redefinen	la	
visión	de	desarrollo	planeado	por	el	gobierno	local?	y	explica	la	metodología	empleada.		







El	 capítulo	 3	 describe	 las	 prácticas	 de	 los	 ocho	 grupos	 (SPR)	 que	 no	 consiguieron	
recursos	 de	 SUPLADER	 y	 tratan	de	 compensar	 con	una	 inversión	 inicial	 de	Alianza	 para	 el	
Campo	(Alianza).	Para	completar	la	gestión	del	proyecto,	los	grupos	se	vincularon	con	algunas	
agencias	 gubernamentales,	 municipios	 y	 comunidades,	 así	 como	 con	 agentes	 externos	




El	 capítulo	4	describe	el	desarrollo	de	una	configuración	 ideal	de	 invernaderos	que	
incluyó	elementos	tecnológicos,	sociales	y	culturales	asociados	con	las	prácticas	de	seguridad,	






de	Latour	 (2008);	ésta	me	permitió	 interpretar	cómo	 los	actores-red	se	 incorporaron	en	el	
proyecto	de	invernaderos.	
El	 capítulo	 5	 describe	 una	 tentativa	 encabezada	 por	 17	 SPRs	 integrantes	 de	 la	
Asociación	 que	 decidieron	 construir	 sus	 invernaderos	 con	 un	 proveedor	 alternativo	 de	
invernaderos	 (ACEA).	Para	obtener	 los	 fondos	necesarios	para	 la	construcción,	 se	 iniciaron	
nuevas	negociaciones	con	una	serie	de	organismos.	El	movimiento	contribuyó	a	consolidar	a	
la	Asociación	y	su	arraigo	institucional.		
En	 el	 capítulo	 6,	 la	 Asociación	 se	 muestra	 como	 un	 colectivo	 heterogéneo	 con	
diferentes	agendas.	Esta	heterogeneidad	dio	lugar	a	diversos	conflictos,	algunos	de	ellos,	con	




El	 capítulo	 7	 presenta	 la	 etapa	 final	 del	 SUPLADER	 que	 afecta	 al	 proyecto	 de	
invernaderos	de	La	Ciénega.	Después	de	complejas	negociaciones	y	conflictos	dentro	de	 la	
Asociación,	se	obtuvo	el	crédito	complementario	para	la	construcción	de	los	invernaderos.	Sin	
embargo,	 con	 la	 campaña	electoral	municipal	 cambiaron	 las	 reglas	del	 juego,	 así	 como	de	
algunos	actores	involucrados;	esta	situación	modificó	las	condiciones	del	proyecto,	teniendo	
la	 Asociación	 que	 hacer	 frente	 a	 las	 intervenciones	 de	 agentes	 externos.	 El	 juego	 de	 las	
negociaciones	 se	 reinició,	 activando	 un	 nuevo	 conjunto	 de	 estrategias	 (entre	 otras	 para	
obtener	 el	 financiamiento	 directamente	 a	 través	 del	 nuevo	 delegado	 de	 la	 SEPLADE).	
Finalmente,	algunos	de	los	fondos	de	la	Asociación	fueron	re-apropiados	y	asignados	a	la	USPR	
Agrícola	 Tsakapu	 y	 a	diferentes	 facciones	que	 competían	por	 los	 recursos,	 redefiniendo	 la	
escena.	
El	 capítulo	 8	 proporciona	 la	 discusión	 y	 conclusión	 de	 esta	 investigación,	 en	 él	 se	
presentan	ideas	para	construir	y	discutir	lo	que	Mosse	(2005)	identifica	como	políticas	para	
promover	el	desarrollo,	y	que	están	asociadas	a	las	demandas	organizativas	y	son	necesarias	
para	 mantener	 las	 relaciones	 existentes	 (en	 lugar	 de	 promover	 una	 política	 previamente	
definida).	 Sin	 embargo,	 en	 el	 caso	 de	 La	 Ciénega,	 los	 agentes	 de	 cambio	 (incluyendo	 el	
Congreso	 de	Michoacán)	 apoyaron	 y	 empujaron	 la	 iniciativa	 de	 los	 planificadores	 para	 el	
desarrollo	 regional.	 De	 acuerdo	 con	 Ferguson	 (1994),	 concluyo	 que	 el	 desarrollo	 debe	
entenderse	 en	 relación	 con	 los	 intereses	 político-económico-culturales	 de	 los	 actores	 que	
pueden	ser	afines	o	confrontados	con	el	diseño	e	implementación	de	los	programas	para	el	
desarrollo.	 esta	 interacción	 no	 es	 lineal,	 hegemónica	 ni	 rígida,	 sino	 que,	 las	 prácticas	 y	
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Name of the activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
I. Introductory Program 
CERES Orientation CERES,WUR  March - April 
2002 
4 
Presentation Tutorials CERES, WUR May 2002 5 
II. Research Methods, Techniques and Domain-specific theories 
-Summer school  Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague 
June 2005 1 
-Action Research Seminar  TAO Group, WUR June - September 
2002 
1 
Writing research proposal  RDS, WUR 2001-2002 5 
III. General skills (100 hours)  
-Conference on ‘Agency, knowledge 
and power’ 
RDS, WUR December 2001 1 
-Globalisation and its Discontents: 
The Future of Theory 
ISS, The Hague April  2002 1 
-Holes in the Wall? Fortress Europe 
and the Migration in the 21st Century 
ISS, The Hague April 2002 1 
-International Conference on 
Globalization and Poverty 
ISS, The Hague October  2002 1 
-Participation in 'advanced research 
seminar' of WP-2. 
WUR September – 
October 2002 
2 
-Advanced Research Seminars RDS, WUR April-June 2005 4 
IV. Additional training  
Globalization and networks CERES, Utrecht April-May 2005 5 
Attending CERES tutorials Hoorneboeg, Hilversum May-June 2005 5 
Total (minimum 30 ECTS)   36.0 
 
*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work 
 
